

A Proposal by C-CAT

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A Canadian Proposal for Listing
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
as a Terrorist Entity

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Executive Summary

C-CAT: Since its founding in 2004, the Canadian Coalition Against Terror (C-CAT) has called on the government to list the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist entity under section 83.05 of the *Criminal Code*. Listing the IRGC is essentially a unilateral Canadian prerogative that can and should be pursued in the framework of Canada's ongoing anti-terrorism efforts and human rights advocacy – independently of any nuclear context.

The IRGC and Canadian Law – No Legal Obstacle to Listing the IRGC: Section 83.05 of the *Criminal Code* empowers the Governor in Council to create by regulation a list of entities that are treated as terrorist groups. The Governor in Council should add the IRGC to this list. The IRGC's actions fall under the rubric of “terrorist activity” as proscribed by Canadian law; the IRGC may be considered an “entity” for these purposes; there is existing precedent in Canadian law for defining a state agency as a terrorist organization; and even without such precedent, the IRGC is arguably too autonomous to be considered a state agency.

The IRGC and Global Terror: The revolutionary doctrine of Iran has generated an insatiable drive in Iran's ruling elite to establish Iran as a regional and global power through subversion and terror. To this end, Iran has provided extensive logistical support and billions of dollars of capital to terrorist organizations across the globe. The IRGC is the principal body engaged in sponsoring terrorist and militant groups and activity both in Iran and abroad. The resultant atrocities have rivaled or exceeded the exploits of most, if not all, of the terrorist organizations presently listed by Canada. The IRGC controls Iran's missile batteries and is deeply involved in all aspects of Iran's nuclear program. The IRGC *in its entirety* is an entity that has, from its inception, facilitated, supported and directly committed acts that are deemed “terrorist activity” under Canadian law.

The IRGC as a Political and Economic Force Keeping an Illegitimate Regime in Power: In the aftermath of Iran's recent presidential elections, the IRGC played a key role in crushing dissent – leading many analysts to describe the events surrounding the contested election as an IRGC “coup”.

The IRGC is neither an Ordinary State Agency, nor an Ordinary Branch of Iran's Armed Forces: Policymakers ought to consider whether the listing process should also apply to entities like the IRGC that arguably constitute a branch or agency of the armed services of another state. C-CAT submits that Canada should even so list the IRGC on the following grounds:

- i. Iran's Constitution (which is the ostensible source of the IRGC's legitimacy) is a mission statement for a theologically premised global movement that promotes terrorism, the violation of international law and the destruction of the international order. The Iranian Constitution and the regime it mandates are *sui generis* – and therefore constitute their own category. There is no comparable founding document of any other contemporary country. Whereas constitutions generally provide limits on power, this “Constitution” does the opposite, providing almost unlimited power to a single person – the Supreme Leader – and creating governmental structures that can simply be dismissed or dissolved at his whim. Merely being listed in a Constitution does not automatically confer the privileges of the constitutional legitimacy associated with a state any more than creating a sham corporation would provide the protections of incorporation. A

Constitution which inherently denies the legitimacy of other states and religions, seeks their destruction or submission, and whose constitutional agencies are openly mandated to propagate that ideology, should not be granted the protections and legitimacy it does not afford to others.

- ii. Defining the IRGC as a “branch of the armed forces” of another country is a misnomer. The IRGC is more like Hizbullah or Hamas, which are ideologically-based organizations that develop military, business, social and cultural capacities to advance their agenda. The military aspect is just one dimension of a unique ideological mandate that is virtually borderless, allowing the IRGC a multitude of political, cultural, economic as well as military functions.
- iii. Given its level of operational control, independence from government hierarchy, and economic self-sufficiency, the IRGC has more than sufficient autonomy from government control and accountability to be considered a non-state actor for the purposes of listing it as a terrorist entity in Canada.

Listing the IRGC – A Smart Sanction: Listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity is a sanction that would target the nerve centre of Iran's nuclear, terrorist and human rights abuses. It would also deter Canadian business and financial institutions from dealing with Iranian businesses associated with the IRGC, for fear of fines or other criminal sanctions.

Listing the IRGC – Smart Canadian Policy: Listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity is good policy for the following reasons:

- i. First, Canada would not be standing alone in listing the IRGC. The U.S., U.N., E.U. and others have all applied various sanctions against the IRGC and/or its leaders.
- ii. Second, listing the IRGC should not be perceived as a departure from existing policy. Listing the IRGC would help achieve the intent of the (limited) sanctions against Iran that Canada has already implemented. Given that Canada has imposed much more severe sanctions against non-global threats like Zimbabwe and Myanmar, listing the IRGC would be a function of maintaining consistent standards in the formulation of sanctions-related policy.
- iii. Third, the IRGC has been directly involved in the murder, injury, torture and incarceration of Canadian citizens, while its support of the Taliban in Afghanistan constitutes a mortal threat to Canadian Forces stationed there. Canada is therefore justified and obligated to take strong measures against the IRGC. To do otherwise is to be derelict in the most basic obligation incumbent upon a sovereign state – to provide maximum protection for its soldiers and citizens.
- iv. Fourth, listing the IRGC would complement other areas of Canadian policy, including the *Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act*. It would provide critical “teeth” that this bill will need to help deter Iran and compensate its many victims, and achieve the bill’s broader objectives of deterring terror and compensating victims.

PART I

Legal and Policy Considerations for Listing the IRGC as a Terrorist Entity

Listing the IRGC – “Quote Unquote”

Jane’s Weekly – Listing the IRGC “A Fatal Risk to Khameni”

“Deliberations in Washington about listing the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation is perceived by Khamenei as another step to pave the way to attack IRGC assets without a need for US Congress' authorisation. This represents a fatal risk to Khamenei, as the IRGC remains the primary armed entity entrusted to guard the theocratic regime that Khamenei oversees from the Office of the Supreme Leader.”¹

Liberal Foreign Affairs Critic Bob Rae: List the IRGC **(Dec. 9, 2009)**

“The Liberal Party of Canada, through the Hon. Bob Rae, Official Opposition Critic for Foreign Affairs, and Mark Holland, Official Opposition Critic for Public Safety, has called on the...government to...designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization immediately.”²

Liberal Public Safety Critic Mark Holland: Canada Should Push the Rest of the **World on the IRGC** **(Dec. 4, 2009)**

“It’s time for Canada to speak out against the IRGC and push the rest of the world to follow. We strongly urge the Harper government to make this official designation immediately.”³

Minister Stockwell Day [then Minister of Public Safety] **(Sept. 2007)**

“Canada is ‘very concerned’ about Tehran's intervention outside its borders and has not ruled out banning the Iranian Revolutionary Guard under the Anti-Terrorism Act.”⁴

**President Barack Obama [then Senator and Co-Sponsor of the
Iran Counter-Proliferation Act]**

Iran Counter-Proliferation Act 2007: “The Secretary of State should designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guards as a Foreign Terrorist Organization...and the Secretary of the Treasury should place the Iranian Revolutionary Guards on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists under executive Order 13224.”⁵

Sen. Obama: “We do need to tighten sanctions on the Iranian regime, particularly on Iran's Revolutionary Guard, which sponsors terrorism far beyond Iran's borders.”⁶

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)

“[The NIE] accurately noted that the tool most likely to alter Iran's nuclear calculus – if any – is targeted political and economic pressure, not military action.”⁷

Former Senior UN Diplomat Victor Comras⁸

“... designation [of the IRGC in the US] open[s] the door to possible civil litigation against foreign companies doing business with terrorists under the Anti Terrorism Act of 1996. These Rulings could well prove to be among the most important factors in dissuading certain foreign companies that do business in the United States from also conducting business with the IRGC.”⁹

Iran Specialist Patrick Clawson¹⁰

“Applying the sanctions lessons of the last twenty years to Iran, the clear implication is that Western interests are best served by measures that target the regime's leaders. But how vulnerable to economic pressure are Iran's leaders? ...Iran's leaders in fact devote much of their efforts to lining their own pockets – fighting more often and viciously to protect their incomes than their ideas.”¹¹

**U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey and
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson**

Speaking in Dubai in March 2007, US Under Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey warned, “When corporations do business with IRGC companies, they are doing business with organizations that are providing direct support to terrorism.” In a July 2007 speech, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson stated that “The IRGC is so deeply entrenched in Iran's economy and commercial enterprises; it is increasingly likely that if you are doing business with Iran, you are somehow doing business with the IRGC.”¹²

Washington Post Journalist David Ignatius

“These new, targeted financial measures [listing the IRGC] are to traditional sanctions what Super Glue is to Elmer's Glue-All.”¹³

**Middle East Expert Rasool Nafisi: Listing is Major Blow to IRGC Status, Prestige
and Economic Activities**

“I think it [the listing of the IRGC by the US] is very important because from now on, if the policy is carried out, the movement of the IRGC members abroad would become very very hard – especially in neighboring countries. They could easily be detained as terrorists. So I think that it's a major blow to the status and movement of the IRGC. Secondly because it is a large conglomerate with a tremendous amount of assets and is involved in business, it would not be able to do business in Afghanistan, with Iraq, with neighbouring countries; and that's going to be another major issue. Thirdly if you look at the fact that a large organization like that is put on the list of terror organizations and if Interpol accepts that, then it's going to be a major issue for the IRGC, as a legitimate Iranian institution. I think that it's basically a very major blow to the status, prestige and economic activities and movement of the organization.”¹⁴

Holland Parliamentarians Recommend Putting IRGC on EU-Terror list
(Nov. 27, 2009)

“A majority of the Netherlands parliament voted this past week to place Iran's elite military unit, the Revolutionary Guards, on the European Union (EU) terror list. The Dutch resolution appears to be the first European motion to target the IRGC as a terrorist entity. The resolution cited the IRGC's support for Hamas and Hizbullah as reasons to label the Guards as an unlawful organization fomenting terror.”¹⁵

* This was in fact a resolution to recommend that the Dutch government and the E.U. consider listing the IRGC.

British Politicians Urge EU to Impose Sanctions Targeting Iran's IRGC
(Nov. 2007)

“The U.S. decision to impose sanctions against the IRGC and the Iranian Ministry of Defence will ‘contribute greatly’ to slashing funding for the ‘world's number one state sponsor of terrorism’. ‘Our committee believes that for sanctions to have a meaningful effect, they must be multilateral. It therefore feels that it is in the interest of world peace and stability and an asset to the fight against terrorism for the European Union and in particular the United Kingdom to follow suit’, the Parliamentarians said.”¹⁶

Listing the IRGC: **Legal and Policy Considerations**

1. Listing the IRGC – C-CAT’s Role

Since its founding in 2004, C-CAT has advocated for listing the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist entity under section 83.05 of the *Criminal Code*. In 2006, C-CAT made its first presentation on this subject to Stockwell Day, then Minister of Public Safety, and Jason Kenney, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, and others.

Over the last several years, the arguments for deeming the IRGC a terrorist entity have only grown more cogent, and C-CAT has consistently raised this issue with government officials. The direct involvement of Iranian leaders and the IRGC in global terrorism is not a matter of conjecture, nor are the obvious limitations of international efforts to curtail the IRGC's sponsorship of terror.

The IRGC and its proxies are undeniably responsible for atrocities across the globe that rival or exceed the exploits of most, if not all, of the terrorist organizations presently listed by Canada and the UN. They have earned their place along with al-Qaeda and other groups on Canada's list of proscribed terrorist entities.

In light of recent political events in Iran, which have focused a much needed spotlight on the IRGC's brutality and the threat it poses to international security, the listing issue should be given serious and immediate consideration by the Canadian government.

This paper will present an overview of IRGC's activities and the arguments for listing this body as a terrorist entity under the provisions of the *Criminal Code*.

2. The IRGC – An Overview

A. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. Islamic Revolutionary Corps; a.k.a. Pasdaran; a.k.a. Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami; a.k.a. Pasdaran-e Inqilab; a.k.a. Revolutionary Guard; a.k.a. Revolutionary Guards; a.k.a. Sepah; a.k.a. Sepah Pasdaran; a.k.a. Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami; a.k.a. the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; a.k.a. the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.¹⁷

B. Iran and the IRGC as Terror Sponsors and Perpetrators

Iran's revolutionary doctrine has generated an insatiable drive in Iran's ruling elite to establish Iran as a regional and global power through subversion and terror.¹⁸ To this end, Iran has provided extensive logistical support and billions of dollars of capital to terrorist organizations across the globe,¹⁹ including

both Shiite and Sunni terror organizations, in a campaign to galvanize Islamist and radical forces under the Iranian banner. Iran has also had ongoing and substantial involvement with al-Qaeda.²⁰

Unlike some state sponsors of terror that provide peripheral, relatively passive or episodic support to surrogate practitioners of terror, Iran's involvement is active, direct, and meticulously orchestrated at both the strategic and tactical levels. Iran regards terrorism as an essential and highly effective instrument of foreign policy, military strategy, and religious revolution.²¹ **Iran is the only state with a formal nine digit budget line for financing international terror.**²²

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Qods Force (IRGC-QF) are the principal bodies engaged in working with foreign terrorist and militant groups and exporting the Islamic fundamentalist revolution. The IRGC provides critical support to terrorist and militant groups in the form of funding, weapons and explosives, basic and specialized training, and intelligence and targeting support.²³ The IRGC has a worldwide reach, spanning North America, Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.

Lebanon is considered to be the flagship of Iran's revolutionary export and serves as a bulwark of Iranian-backed terror throughout the region. The IRGC has effectively created within Lebanon a satellite state within a state, where Hizbullah and its Iranian mentors are a major political and military force armed with tens of thousands of ballistic missiles.

It should be noted here that Hizbullah is considered by many experts to be a greater global threat than al-Qaeda.²⁴ In 2008 alone, Iran is reported to have provided Hizbullah with more than \$200 million in funding²⁵ and is estimated to have “invested” over \$20 billion in Hizbullah companies in Lebanon.²⁶ As Iran's flagship terrorist proxy, Hizbullah is responsible for numerous terrorist attacks across the world; it has set up networks across the globe; it has established 800 sleeper cells in 20 European countries; and it has extensive involvement in transnational crime.²⁷ (See Appendix 1 for an overview of the IRGC's global terrorist exploits.)

C. The IRGC as a Political Force – The IRGC is the backbone of the Iranian regime. It controls Iran's missile batteries, is deeply involved in Iran's nuclear program,²⁸ and is responsible for the “export” of Iran's Islamic Revolution and the promotion of Iranian-sponsored terror and subterfuge throughout the world. IRGC members fill many key political posts. Today, 12 of President Ahmadinejad's 21 cabinet ministers are members of the IRGC,²⁹ as is the president himself. Moreover, IRGC members hold nearly a third of the seats in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis). The majority of Iran's 30 provinces have governors from the IRGC, and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator is also an IRGC member.³⁰ IRGC personnel have filled key diplomatic posts, bureaucratic appointments and mayoralties.³¹ In the aftermath of Iran's recent presidential elections, the IRGC and its subsidiary, the Basij (a volunteer militia numbering in the millions), played a key role in crushing dissent – leading many analysts to describe the events surrounding the contested election as an IRGC “coup”.³²

D. The IRGC as an Economic Force – The IRGC is a vast multi-billion dollar conglomerate reaching into nearly every sector of the economy and dominating the oil and gas industry. Since Ahmadinejad took office in 2005, companies affiliated with the IRGC have been awarded more than 750 government contracts in construction and oil and gas projects.³³ As described by Robin Hughes of Jane's Defense Weekly: “All the money that's coming in serves to make them the most powerful force in Iran...”³⁴

The IRGC also controls a sprawling black-market industry. Much of the smuggling is done through IRGC-controlled airports and docks. In fact, in 1999, then-speaker of the Majlis, Mehdi Karrubi, explicitly detailed the sixty unauthorized docks controlled by the IRGC. One Iranian parliamentarian suggested that “[i]nvisible jetties...and the invisible hand of the “mafia” control 68 percent of Iran's entire exports.”³⁵ Another parliamentarian estimated that IRGC smuggling might amount to \$12 billion per year.³⁶

3. The IRGC and Canada

The global security threat posed by the IRGC has greatly affected Canadians. Consider the following:

A. The IRGC as a Threat to Canadian Forces³⁷

Iran's actions in Afghanistan constitute a mortal threat to Canadian forces stationed there. The full extent of Iranian involvement in Afghanistan may be fully known only to military intelligence sources, but there is no doubt that Iran has been involved in funding and arming the Taliban with sophisticated weaponry. The IRGC-Qods Force is the Iranian regime's primary instrument for providing this lethal support to the Taliban.³⁸

B. Canada as a Target

Canada has also been targeted by Hizbullah. Hizbullah agents have created complex criminal enterprises throughout the U.S. and Canada, raising millions of dollars and enabling the purchase of high-tech equipment for export to the group's Lebanese headquarters.³⁹ Operatives caught by CSIS told interrogators about a cross-Canada Hizbullah network that had conducted surveillance on Canadians targets,⁴⁰ while alleged Hizbullah agents wanted for terrorist activities overseas were found hiding out in Edmonton and Ottawa. In 1997, CSIS warned that Hizbullah had established an infrastructure in Canada “that can assist and support terrorists seeking a safe haven in North America.”⁴¹ A Hizbullah base in Canada was set up by one of that organization's prized agents under the direction of the recently assassinated Imad Mughniyah,⁴² considered to be among the world's most dangerous terrorists. Mughniyah's interest in Canada cannot be dismissed as simply a local Hizbullah initiative originating in Lebanon. **Mughniyah worked within the highest levels of IRGC and was a link between Iran and Hizbullah, taking orders from Iran's Supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and reporting to the head of the Qods Force.**⁴³

C. The IRGC and the Assault on Canadian Civilians

i. The Murder of Zahra Kazemi

In June 2003, Iranian-Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi was brutally assaulted, raped and murdered by Iranian security officials. Eventually, Iran's vice-president admitted Ms. Kazemi had died while being beaten. Two intelligence agents were charged while the Iranian parliament accused Tehran prosecutor-general Saeed Mortazavi of trying to cover up the murder. The agents were acquitted while Mr. Mortazavi remained untouched. Ms. Kazemi sustained her injuries while being held in the notorious Evin Prison, which is partially controlled by the IRGC.⁴⁴ The last 26 hours that Ms. Kazemi spent in Evin were under the control of the Ministry of Intelligence,⁴⁵ headed at that time by Mr. Ali Younesi, the former Head of the Politico-Ideological Bureau of the IRGC.⁴⁶ Later, Ms. Kazemi was transferred to Baghiatollah al-Azam military hospital where she died from her injuries after being disconnected from

life support (reportedly without the permission of her son or mother).⁴⁷ That hospital is fully controlled by the IRGC.⁴⁸ The involvement of the IRGC and its personnel in the abuses of Ms. Kazemi at Evin and in the subsequent cover-up warrants further investigation.

Despite diplomatic protests, Iran still has refused to recognize Ms. Kazemi's Canadian citizenship and to return her body to Canada where her son resides. (See Appendix 2 for further detail.)

ii. The Murder of Scott Goldberg and the Injuries to Dr. Sherri Wise

Hamas relies on Iranian financial support for survival, and its members are being trained by Iran through the IRGC and its Hizbullah proxy. After the second Lebanon war, Iran increased its direct support for Hamas, pledging \$250 million in October 2006, including \$100 million to pay PA government salaries for six months.⁴⁹ Estimates vary but CSIS assesses that Iran transfers somewhere between \$3 million to \$18 million a year to Hamas. According to the CSIS report, “in February 1999, it was reported that Palestinian police had discovered documents that attest to the transfer of \$35 million to Hamas.”⁵⁰ Others estimate the sums to be far greater.⁵¹ Indeed, the total funding for Hamas thus far from Iran may well exceed \$100 million. Hamas members have been shuttled to Iran for training at IRGC camps, and the Qods Force has also reportedly set up training camps in Gaza.⁵²

Several Canadians have lost their lives in Hamas terrorist attacks, including Mr. Scott Goldberg, a father of seven who was murdered when a Hamas terrorist incinerated a busload of travelers in January 2004 in Jerusalem.

Other Canadians have been injured in Hamas attacks, including Dr. Sherri Wise of Vancouver. Dr. Wise was severely injured in a Hamas triple suicide bombing while visiting Jerusalem in 1997. The American courts have already held Iran liable in that attack, because of its support for Hamas.

4. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

A. How does an entity become a listed [terrorist] entity under the Criminal Code?

Section 83.05 of the *Criminal Code* empowers the Governor in Council (i.e. the Cabinet) to create by regulation a list of entities that are to be considered terrorist groups. The *Criminal Code* does not make it illegal for listed entities to exist per se but does make it a criminal offense to have financial dealings with those entities, as well as to participate in, contribute to, facilitate and enhance their terrorist activities.⁵³

Section 83.05 provides that an entity can be listed when there are “reasonable grounds to believe that”:

- (a) the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or
- (b) the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or in association with an entity referred to in paragraph (a).

The criminal and/or security intelligence reports are submitted to the Minister of Public Safety for consideration. If the Minister “has reasonable grounds to believe” that the above test is met, the Minister can make a recommendation to the Governor in Council to place the entity on the list. If in turn the Governor in Council is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the above test has been met, the entity may be placed on the list.

B. What is the standard of proof that must be met for an entity to be listed?

The Minister of Public Safety and the Governor in Council must have reasonable grounds to believe that the entity has carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity, or is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or in association with such an entity. The Department of the Solicitor General states that “[r]easonable grounds to believe is a standard of proof that relates to what the courts have described as a ‘credibly based probability’ that something exists or has occurred. In effect, this means that the standard of proof is based on credible facts that go beyond a mere suspicion. It must be established that objective, reasonable grounds in fact exist.”⁵⁴

C. What are the legal implications of being a listed entity?

As mentioned above, it is not illegal for listed entities to exist. However, being listed places such an entity within the *Criminal Code* definition of a “terrorist group”, which is defined in section 83.01(1) as:

- (a) an entity that has one of its purposes or activities facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or
 - (b) a listed entity
- and includes an association of such entities.

The consequences of being listed include:

- ❖ The entity's property can be the subject of seizure, restraint and/or forfeiture.
- ❖ Institutions such as banks, credit societies, trust companies and loan companies are subject to reporting requirements with respect to an entity's property and must ensure they are not in possession or control of property owned or controlled by or on behalf of a listed entity.
- ❖ It becomes illegal to knowingly participate in or contribute to any activity of the listed entity for the purpose of enhancing its ability to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity.
- ❖ It becomes illegal for a person to knowingly instruct another person to carry out any activity for a listed entity for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the listed entity to carry out a terrorist activity.
- ❖ The *Criminal Code* also prohibits anyone from providing, collecting or making available property or other financial services, intending or knowing that it will be used to carry out terrorist activity or to benefit a terrorist group (which includes a listed entity).

D. Should the IRGC be considered an “entity” for the purposes of the listing process?

Yes. Section 83.01(1) of the *Criminal Code* defines “entity” as “a person, group, trust, partnership or fund or an unincorporated association or organization.”⁵⁵ In other words, “entity” is a broadly inclusive term that should be understood to cover anything from a single individual to a broad array of structures or groupings. This non-exhaustive definition may therefore include virtually anyone or any type of grouping that engages in or supports acts of terror that the *Criminal Code* seeks to prevent and deter. The IRGC is such a group, which includes within it a variety of structures such as: military units, financial structures, paramilitary and unofficial policing and enforcement entities (used to suppress dissent), cultural associations, multi-billion dollar “charitable” bodies (called “bonyards”) that might be considered similar to trusts, and criminal organizations involved in transnational crime.

Given the apparent intent of Part II.1 of the *Criminal Code* to prevent acts of terrorism – in part by proscribing financial relationships with those who engage in acts of terror – the law should not allow Canadians to enable terrorist activity through financial dealings with the IRGC either as a “group” or with its personnel as individuals, or with any of its affiliated structures or businesses.

E. How will listing the IRGC complement other related areas of government policy?

i. The IRGC and Canadian Leadership on Iran: Canada has implemented multilateral and some unilateral sanctions against Iran, and has taken the lead at the UN in the passage of resolutions censuring the Iranian regime's dismal human rights record. While laudable, these measures have not achieved their objectives, due in part to the narrow scope of the sanctions.⁵⁶ The existing measures against Iran are far weaker than those imposed in the past on non-global threats such as the Congo, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Haiti,⁵⁷ Burma, and Zimbabwe.

C-CAT therefore recently submitted a separate proposal to the government for expanding Canada's present sanctions regime against Iran by way of the *Special Economic Measures Act* (“SEMA”), which would prohibit any entity in Canada from providing or helping Iran obtain (i) refined petroleum or gas, or (ii) dual use technologies. This proposal also includes a recommendation that Canada list the IRGC as a terrorist entity under the *Criminal Code*. Given the IRGC's stranglehold on the Iranian economy, effective targeted sanctions against this entity will be critical to the success of any international effort to address the Iranian threat. The listing of the IRGC, with its vast commercial enterprises, will make Canadian businesses – including financial institutions – far more careful about doing business in Canada, Iran or elsewhere with any entity that may be associated or controlled by the IRGC. This was the result of a similar measure introduced by the US Treasury Department in 2007. Failing to proscribe financial dealings with the IRGC will only strengthen the most extreme elements of the Iranian regime and thereby undermine Canada's stated objectives in imposing sanctions on Iran.

Deeming the IRGC a terrorist entity should not be perceived as a radical departure from existing Canadian policy. Canada is already enforcing UN mandated sanctions against Iran, which include partial sanctions against some individuals and entities connected to the IRGC. Listing the IRGC is simply a function of maintaining consistent standards in the formulation of sanctions-related policy, and achieving the intent of those sanctions against Iran that Canada has already implemented.⁵⁸

ii. The IRGC and the *Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act*: In June 2009, the Minister of Public Safety introduced Bill C-35, which would allow Canadian victims of terror to launch civil suits against the supporters and perpetrators of terrorism, which can include individuals, listed entities and foreign states.

This bill will only be effective to the extent that it casts the broadest possible net for application to the maximum number of listed entities and their supporters. Given Iran's preeminence in sponsoring terrorism and the centrality of the IRGC in the execution of Iran's terrorist objectives, the efficacy of this bill would be vastly diminished by the exclusion of the IRGC from the list of terrorist entities. Listing the IRGC provides critical “teeth” that this bill will need to help deter Iran and compensate its many victims.

F. What are the political advantages of listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity as opposed to other types of sanctions?

As discussed above, C-CAT’s proposal involving the *Special Economic Measures Act* (“SEMA”) would prohibit any entity in Canada from providing or helping Iran to obtain (i) refined petroleum or gas, or (ii) dual use technologies. However, the application of broader economic sanctions of this sort entails more complex considerations, which may include consultations with Canada’s allies in the context of broader negotiations with Iran.

In contrast, listing the IRGC is essentially a unilateral Canadian prerogative that can and should be pursued in the framework of Canada's ongoing anti-terrorism efforts and human rights advocacy – independently of any nuclear context. Listing the IRGC is not a ground-breaking measure that will disrupt international efforts with regard to Iran (the U.S. has already listed the IRGC, and the U.N. has imposed partial sanctions on some IRGC members and related entities). It should therefore be pursued by Canada as a domestic initiative that does not require multilateral coordination.

Furthermore, listing the IRGC can be implemented in Canada without undergoing a complicated legislative process, and can be acted on immediately. The IRGC deserves a place on Canada's list of entities and will remain deserving – regardless of the results of any nuclear negotiations. It should be noted that these nuclear negotiations, even in the best of circumstances, will not result in the dissolution of the IRGC or the cessation of its terrorist activities.

G. Given the IRGC's commitment to the ruling regime, can it be deterred by sanctions?

It should not be assumed that the “revolutionary” disposition of the IRGC and the theological zeal of many of its leaders and members make its membership impervious to deterrence through sanctions. The IRGC is not monolithic. Some IRGC former commanders who do not share Iran’s goals have already defected to the U.S., while hundreds of others have gone into low-profile exile, mostly as businessmen in the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and Turkey.

The critical chink in the armour of the IRGC may be the corruption and wealth of IRGC members who have become enriched through the organization's money-making enterprises, often funneling their money abroad into the Gulf States, most notably Dubai. Behind the façade of a simple pious existence, these individuals live in mansions in the exclusive hills of northern Teheran with the latest model of car

in the garage, luxury hand-woven rugs on the floor, wardrobes full of designer clothes, and a safe packed with diamond and gold jewelry. In fact, many prominent IRGC commanders may be regarded as businessmen first and military leaders second. Usually, they have a brother or a cousin in Europe or Canada to look after their business interests and keep a channel open to the small and big “satans” in case the regime falls. A few IRGC commanders, including some at the top, do not relish a conflict with the U.S. that could destroy their business empires without offering Iran victory on the battlefield.⁵⁹

This emphasis on material success means that financial sanctions against the IRGC and its members could have the desired effects of making them think twice about their involvement with the IRGC and terrorist activity.⁶⁰

H. Are there any precedents in Canada for listing a state agency as a terrorist entity?

The suggestion that a state agency could be defined as a “terrorist organization” for certain legal purposes does have some precedent in Canadian jurisprudence, as demonstrated in the case of Mansour Ahani.

Mansour Ahani, an Iranian national, entered Canada and acquired refugee status in 1991. CSIS formed the opinion that Ahani was a trained assassin for the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence Security (MOIS). Ahani met with CSIS agents upon returning from a trip to Europe, and allegedly admitted to them that he had met with a former MOIS associate. In June 1993, Canada’s Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Solicitor General issued a certificate declaring Ahani to be inadmissible both as a member of a terrorist organization and as one who there are reasonable grounds to believe has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism or violence that “would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada.”⁶¹ Notable here is that the Canadian government deemed a state agency – in this case Iran’s foreign intelligence service – to be a terrorist organization, and the Supreme Court of Canada upheld that decision.

I. Are there any precedents in other countries for listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity?

Yes. As demonstrated below, Canada would not be alone in taking a stand against the IRGC:

- ❖ The U.S. instituted a similar measure in 2007 and is now poised to enact further sanctions against the IRGC.⁶²
- ❖ The U.N. has applied sanctions to some IRGC members and associated institutions.⁶³
- ❖ The E.U. has expanded the U.N. list, adding other IRGC entities.
- ❖ A resolution was recently passed by Dutch parliamentarians to recommend that Holland and the E.U. consider listing the IRGC.⁶⁴
- ❖ A committee of 50 British MPs has suggested that the IRGC be banned in the E.U.⁶⁵
- ❖ The Liberal Part of Canada recently declared that it would support the listing of the IRGC.⁶⁶

J. Does the State Immunity Act prevent the IRGC from being listed as a terrorist entity?

No. The *State Immunity Act* governs whether foreign states and their agencies can be sued civilly in Canadian courts, not whether entities (even state entities) can be listed as terrorist groups under the *Criminal Code*.

PART II

Should the IRGC be Considered
a Branch of Iran's Armed Forces?

BACKGROUND: **What is the IRGC? “Quote Unquote”**

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khomeini

“Today the IRGC has a determining effect on all international political balances and calculations... If one day this corps ceases to exist in our society, the authority of our Islamic Revolution shall collapse and the calculations of global politics will be upset.”⁶⁷

Mohsen Sazegara,⁶⁸ IRGC Co-Founder and Iranian Dissident

“And now, the Revolutionary Guard is something really strange. It's an organization which is like a political party because they have 80 seats in the parliament; they have more than half of the members of the cabinet. They are like the KGB because they have secret services, and they act like that. And they are like a cartel or trust.” ... “Now, the Revolutionary Guard has been converted into a kind of organization, a kind of government inside the government of Iran.”⁶⁹

RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute

“[The IRGC] has evolved well beyond its... foundations as an ideological guard for the... revolutionary regime. Today, the IRGC functions as an expansive socio-political-economic conglomerate whose influence extends into virtually every corner of Iranian political life and society.... [It can be seen] less as a traditional military entity wielding a navy, ground forces, air force, and a clandestine paramilitary wing...and more as a domestic actor... [t]he IRGC may be more profitably viewed as a deeply entrenched domestic institution. Arguably, this internal role overshadows its significance as a purely military force.”⁷⁰

Maj.-Gen. Ali Ja'fari, IRGC Commander in Chief

“[It] is not solely a military organization” but “also a political and ideological organization.”⁷¹

Dr. Bruce Tefft,⁷² Founding Member of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center

“The [IRGC is]... an organization that probably does not have a counterpart in the Western world, per se. The closest metaphor I could give you probably would be the Brown Shirts, the SA of the Nazi Party during World War II.”

BACKGROUND:
The IRGC and IRAN – *Sui Generis* (i.e. in a class of its own)
“Quote Unquote”

“Killing is a great Divine gift.”

Ayatollah Khomeini: “Those who say Islam should not kill don’t understand [it]. Killing is a great [divine] gift that appears [to man]. A religion that does not include [provisions for] killing and massacre is incomplete. Those who claim that Jesus was averse to killing and war, harm his prophetic mission... Killing is the same as mercy.”⁷³

“Violence is the heart of Islam.”

Ayatollah Yazdi – Senior Advisor to Ahmadinejad and IRGC Leaders: “We must wipe away the shameful stain whereby some people imagine that violence has no place in Islam... we have decided and are determined to argue that violence is the heart of Islam.”⁷⁴

“We will confront the world with our ideology.”

Khomeini perceived Iran as a nation with a mission –“to export our revolution to the whole world”;⁷⁵ “to establish an Islamic state worldwide”;⁷⁶ and “to confront the world with our ideology”.⁷⁷

The Budget

U.S. officials have described the Iranian regime as the world's “central banker of terrorism”, based in part on the declassified fact that Tehran has a nine-digit line item in its budget to support terrorism.⁷⁸

“The national budget that came into effect on March 21, 2008 allocated over \$2 billion to the promotion of revolutionary causes [terrorism].”⁷⁹

“Ten Days of Dawn”

Since 1989 Tehran has hosted an international gathering of terrorist organizations every February. Known as the Ten Days of Dawn, the event attracts scores of terror groups from more than 70 countries across the globe.⁸⁰ For the last 25 years Iran has been the host to the offices of more than three dozen terrorist organizations, from FARC to Hamas to Leninist and Trotskyite groups.⁸¹

BACKGROUND:
The IRGC, IRAN and Terror – *Sui Generis*
“Quote Unquote”

Iranian Death Squads – Abroad

Iranian death squads have killed 127 dissidents, most of them intellectuals, in sixteen countries including the United States and several European nations.⁸² No other regime in recent history has seen so many of its highest officials [including IRGC leaders] implicated in political murders at trials taking place in countries where the rule of law is respected.⁸³

Shiite Leaders: Khomeinism is *Sui Generis* even by Shiite standards

More than 300 Mullahs and students of theology have been executed, thousands are in prison, others are in exile, and all of Iran’s Grand Ayatollahs have been under house arrest on different occasions. More than 100 religious seminaries have been closed and religious instruction in schools has been cut from six hours a week to four. The remaining two hours are devoted to the study of the political thought of Khomeini.

Ayatollah Hassan Sane’i: The Islamic Republic is “as removed from Islam as the moon from the earth.”

Ayatollah Mahmououd Tabatabai-Qomi: The Islamic Republic is “a total and systematic betrayal of Islam. No one should could call this regime Islamic.”

Ayatollah Kazemeini Borujerdi: The regime “is a conspiracy against God and believers.”

Ayatollah Mahdo Rouhani: Khomeinism is “neither Islamic nor Shiite, but despotic.”

Hojat al-Islam Kamaledin Ganjeh’i: Khomeinism is a creation of *Taghut* (“The Rebel” – an Islamic designation for Satan).

Hussein Mussavi Khomeini (Ayatollah Khomeini’s grandson and a mid ranking cleric): The IRI “has no right to be described as Islamic.”

Should the IRGC be Considered a Branch of Iran's Armed Forces?

Preface

As previously discussed, listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity is a policy decision and government prerogative requiring no legislative action. There is no legal obstacle to listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity under the provisions of section 83.05 of the *Criminal Code*. It is evident that the IRGC's actions fall under the rubric of “terrorist activity” already proscribed by Canadian law. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that there is existing precedent in Canadian law for considering a state agency to be a terrorist organization.

The only pertinent concern from a definitional perspective is whether, as a matter of policy, the listing process in section 83.05 should also be applied to entities like the IRGC that ostensibly constitute a branch or agency of the armed services of another state. The listing process to date has only designated entities which are non-state actors. C-CAT argues that Canada should nonetheless list the IRGC on the following grounds:

1. **Consistency and Principle** – Listing the IRGC is consistent with and flows from other related government policies. Failing to list the IRGC will diminish and undermine the impact and integrity of those policies.
2. **Iran as Sui Generis** – The Iranian Constitution (which is the source of the IRGC's legitimacy) and the regime it mandates are *sui generis*, and therefore constitute their own category. Being beyond the fray of constitutional legitimacy and outside the norms of even most totalitarian governance, the IRGC's “official” standing and mandate should not be an impediment to listing.
3. **The IRGC Defined** – The IRGC should not be defined only as a branch of Iran's armed forces.
4. **The IRGC Has Supported, Facilitated and Committed Terrorist Activity** – The IRGC therefore deserves to be listed as a terrorist entity.

1. Consistency and Principle

A. Bill C-35: Policy, State Sovereignty and State Sponsorship of Terrorist Entities

On June 2, 2009, the Canadian government introduced Bill C-35 – the *Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act*. Bill C-35 would allow terror victims to sue the perpetrators of terror, local sponsors of terror, and certain foreign states that have sponsored listed terrorist entities as defined in the *Criminal Code*.

Although the *State Immunity Act* (SIA) presently protects foreign states from most kinds of civil liability in Canadian courts, C-35 would amend the SIA and lift the immunity of those states that appear on a government-approved list of state sponsors of terror. In other words, the SIA would no longer protect these states from civil suits related to terrorist activity and sponsorship. By introducing this legislation, the government advanced the notion that under certain circumstances related to terrorism, state sovereignty should not be an impediment to providing legal recourse to terror victims.

The underlying rationale of C-35 can also provide a framework for exploring similar issues with regard to listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity. Specifically, if terrorism as a phenomenon warrants suspending the legal concept of state sovereignty in order to designate and then sue a foreign state as a terror sponsor, certainly being a branch of the armed services of a foreign state should not be an impediment to listing it as a terrorist entity (albeit under a different mechanism) to achieve a similar goal. Listing the IRGC is not a departure from an existing legal framework. The listing process has already been established and the IRGC already qualifies legally as an “entity” for this purpose. Listing the IRGC does not require creating new legal definitions, exemptions or lists.

Furthermore, it is almost a certainty that the government-approved list of state sponsors of terror (as allowed by Bill C-35) would include Iran. U.S. officials have described the Iranian regime as the world's “central banker of terrorism”, based in part on the declassified fact that Tehran has a nine-digit line item in its budget to support terrorism.⁸⁴ As such, it provides hundreds of millions of dollars to various groups each year.

It is somewhat absurd for the Canadian government to override the protection of sovereign immunity in the case of Iran's sponsorship of terror, but to disallow listing the IRGC, which is that regime's primary facilitator of its terror policies, on the grounds that the IRGC is a branch of a sovereign state.

B. The Security of Information Act and the IRGC – A Paradigm for Protecting Canadian Interests

The *Security of Information Act* (SOIA) seeks to address national security concerns, including threats of espionage by foreign powers and terrorist groups, as well as the intimidation or coercion of ethno-cultural communities in Canada. SOIA focuses on those situations in which it is appropriate for Canada to protect its institutions and citizenry from information-related conduct that is harmful or likely to be harmful to Canada. For example, when a person communicates “safeguarded information” to a foreign entity or terrorist group, and he/she intends to or is reckless as to whether such disclosure will increase that group's capacity to harm Canadian interests or if actual harm results, the person will be liable to

prosecution and imprisonment for life. Another section relates to a person who at the direction of a foreign entity or terrorist group induces or attempts to induce any person to do anything that is likely to harm Canadian interests or which is done for the purpose of increasing the capacity of foreigners to harm Canadian interests. Again, the maximum penalty is imprisonment for life.

Under the provisions of this Act, providing an entity like the IRGC with information harmful to Canadian interests must already be proscribed by this law. It can therefore be argued: If Canadian law has made it illegal to supply organizations like the IRGC with information that is harmful to Canadians or Canadian interests, surely Canada should prohibit financial dealings which support the same illicit actions by the same organizations.

C. The Banning of Hizbullah – A Conservative Legacy

In 2002, the Conservative Official Opposition launched a campaign that eventually succeeded in listing Hizbullah in Canada as a terrorist entity. The Conservatives at the time rightly rejected all arguments for banning only the military wing of Hizbullah while allowing its “social” and “humanitarian” structures to retain their status as legal entities. The Conservatives maintained that position despite threats from Hizbullah and Lebanon of possible retaliation against Canadians.⁸⁵

Now forming the government, the Conservatives are implementing UN sanctions against specific IRGC leaders and designated financial institutions related to their illegal activities. However, given the magnitude of the threat posed by the IRGC's activities, sanctioning individual leaders of the IRGC while exempting the organizational infrastructure that supports their activities may be far more deleterious to global and Canadian security interests than granting legal status to Hizbullah's social welfare sections. The Canadian government should be no less consistent and principled in the case of the IRGC than it was while in Opposition on the matter of Hizbullah.

2. Iran and its Constitution – *Sui Generis*

The IRGC is a constitutionally mandated entity. Should that be an impediment to listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity?

The Constitution and Islam

Ayatollah Beheshti: “...The fundamental error of Iran’s first revolution, the Constitutional Revolution...was to call the new order it created “constitutional” (*mashruti*), a concept that was “borrowed and did not pertain to the Islamic culture.”⁸⁶

Ayatollah Khomeini on the Constitution:

“If laws are needed, Islam has established them all. There is no need for you, after establishing a government to sit down and establish laws....⁸⁷

“...The Constitution of the Islamic Republic means the Constitution of Islam.”⁸⁸

A. Preface – Iran Is Different

Iran cannot readily be compared to other nation states or even to most other totalitarian oligarchies. This distinctiveness must be taken into account when formulating Canadian policy regarding Iran and the IRGC, which should be predicated first and foremost on an accurate analysis of the political character of the regime and its agencies. Before superimposing Western political vocabulary and definitions onto Iran’s institutions, it is imperative to examine Iran’s own language and definitions as articulated in its founding documents and in the words of those who framed it. This will provide some critical insight into the ideological nature and mandate of Iran in general and its agencies in particular.

B. Iran’s Unique “Constitution” and its Global Mandate to “Export the Revolution”

The legal and political import of Iran's Constitution is different not only from the constitutional frameworks of democratic countries but even from those of other totalitarian regimes. For instance, in the case of the USSR and other similar regimes, the underlying principles of their Constitutions are often laudable in theory, albeit violated in practice. If in the aftermath of the fall of the USSR, the emerging states had chosen to adopt and apply the basic principles of the Soviet Constitution, these new states would function as liberal democracies.

The same cannot be said about Iran. The ideological framework of Iran's present day Constitution is based on one self-declared guiding and malevolent principle: the “export of the Revolution” (*sudur inqilab*).⁸⁹ This imperative is a prime tenet of the regime’s ideology, enshrined in its Constitution⁹⁰ and the works of the Imam Khomeini. Khomeini perceived Iran as a nation with a mission “to export our revolution to the whole world”;⁹¹ “to establish an Islamic state worldwide”;⁹² and “to confront the world with our ideology”.⁹³ The commitment to “exporting the revolution” is not only a tactical objective but an essential component of the identity of the regime. The pivotal significance of “exporting the Revolution” was underscored by former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who stated that “revolutionarism” is the *essence* of the regime; without it, Iran would become “an ordinary country”.⁹⁴ Therefore, unlike other Middle Eastern state sponsors of terror, Iran is *sui generis* insofar as this policy of “exporting the revolution” (i.e. terrorism) is not a mere tool in its strategic arsenal, but a fundamental element of the regime’s identity. This is the core value⁹⁵ that has driven Iran to become the world's preeminent state sponsor of terror, a brutal human rights violator, and a nuclear threat to the international community. But this principle is also more than just a core value, strategy and tactic. It is a concept that has supplanted the very idea of Iran as a nation, as exemplified by a statement made by Ayatollah Khomeini: “All this talk about being Iranian and what we should do for Iran is incorrect.... We do not recognize a country named Iran. We have an Islamic republic located in Iran...”⁹⁶

Khomeini made countless other attacks on the idea of Iran as a nation-state and insisted that it is a form of *sherk*, a Koranic term meaning associating other gods with Allah.⁹⁷ To this end, Khomeini set out on an aggressive campaign to Arabize Iran both linguistically and culturally – to replace “Iran” with “Islam”.⁹⁸

So whereas the constitutional frameworks of other nations are focused on structuring and maintaining the political identity and integrity of the nation state, Iran’s Constitution is designed to “*undefine*” Iran as a nation and to redefine it as a cause.⁹⁹ As a nation-state, Iran could be a rival or ally of other nation-states; it could go to war against them or choose coexistence – as dictated by national interest in at least a nominal adherence to the rules of interstate relationships. But its existence as a nation-state would not inherently pose an existential threat to other countries. The same cannot be said with regard to Iran as a “cause”. Khomeini’s Islamic revolution cannot be viewed as a variation of other “revolutions” like those of Castro, Kaddafi or Peron, which are more familiar models to Western policy-makers. This is a revolution that denies the very idea of nation-states and their right to sovereignty as such, and is committed in principle to their destruction.¹⁰⁰

This is also what sets Iran apart from other countries that sponsor terrorism, such as Syria. These countries are nation-states seeking to enhance their power through illegitimate means like terrorism, but normative state “interests” are still recognizable incentives for their actions. These countries may take hostile action against a perceived enemy, but they do not define themselves as a “cause” mandated from above to destroy all other state structures¹⁰¹ and to force their citizens to adopt their belief systems. If the US were to be supportive of Syrian or Cuban aspirations, their enmity with the US would be largely curtailed. But for Iran, the destruction of United States and the West in general remains a publicly declared theological imperative regardless of how many concessions and accommodations have been made or offered over the last three decades.

C. The Limits of Constitutional Validity

Iran Expert, Said Amir Arjomand:

Khomeini’s position as Leader of the Constitution endowed him with extra-constitutional powers of the Supreme Jurist and ensured his continued supremacy over the Constitution... The [Supreme] Leader is the clerical monarch ruling with more extensive powers than any constitutional monarch or elected president in the world.¹⁰²

An antinomian ideology is the active ingredient that permeates Iran’s constitutional framework. Virtually all the primary structures and mechanisms mandated in the Constitution are crafted to promote this ideology and virtually all constitutional provisions can be suspended to that end. For practical purposes, only two constitutional imperatives remain inviolate – the export of the revolution and the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader.¹⁰³ The Supreme Leader is charged with overseeing the Revolution, and wields absolute authority not only over the affairs of the entire Muslim *ummah* (nation) but over “the entire world and all that exists in it, whether earthbound or flying creatures, inanimate

objects, plants, animals, and anything in any way related to collective or individual human life, all human affairs, belongings, or assets.”¹⁰⁴ The Leader has virtually unlimited political power. He can suspend not only the Constitution but even the basic principles of Islam if the interests of the Revolution require it.¹⁰⁵

Even a *realpolitik* scale for legitimacy must have limits in any principled foreign policy. Iran’s revolutionary entities have gone beyond the tolerated fringes of legitimacy, demonstrating time and again that Khomeini’s Constitution is more of an ideological mandate for global terrorism and conflict than a framework for governance. If a state were to be founded on similarly reprehensible principles (like the enslavement of others or racism) and structured its government to those ends, creating specially mandated entities to pursue these goals – would Canada not be justified in formulating a policy that considers this Constitution and its mandated institutions illegitimate? The Iranian regime has been founded on principles that are no less vile, and in fact present a greater threat to the entire international community. Canadian policy should therefore not afford the founding document of this regime – the blueprint for so much carnage – the benefits implied in interstate parlance by the word “Constitution”.

Unlike the Soviet army or the KGB, the IRGC’s essential mandate is not to be a conventional force and it is not guilty of deviating from a legitimate mandate. If another “unconventional” force like the Janjaweed were to become a sovereign branch of the Sudanese army, or if al-Qaeda were to be formally co-opted into Pakistan’s military, would Canada grant them the status of a branch of the armed forces of those countries? Would Canada remove al-Qaeda from the list of banned terrorist entities simply because it had become constitutionally mandated? Merely being listed in a Constitution does not automatically confer the privileges of constitutional legitimacy any more than creating a sham corporation would provide the protections of incorporation.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that even if one were to argue that Iran’s constitutional framework should be viewed like that of any other country, the IRGC would still fall outside of that framework. Ali Alfoneh, a Shi’ite theologian and visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, correctly noted that the “IRGC now interprets its operational freedom so broadly that it accepts no constitutional restrictions.”¹⁰⁶ Not only has the IRGC overridden any constitutional limitation that may exist, but it has usurped governmental powers not mandated by the Constitution and has acted outside the purview of the law to which it is theoretically bound.¹⁰⁷ If the IRGC is not bound by Iran’s constitutional and legal framework, there is no compelling reason for the international community to recognize it as part of such a framework.

D. Conclusion

In summary, Iran’s “Constitution” is *sui generis* in content and application. There is no comparable founding document of any other contemporary country. It is a document designed to foster the perpetual enmity of Iranians and Muslims towards the global community and to create a national and theological imperative to commit terrorism and other egregious violations of international law in order to undermine the sovereignty of other nations. Whereas Constitutions generally provide limits on power, this “Constitution” actually does the opposite, providing almost unlimited power to a single person – the Supreme Leader – and creating governmental structures that can simply be dismissed or dissolved at his whim. Iranian dissident Mohsen Sazegara, a founder of the IRGC who is now at Harvard, put it

succinctly: “Iran has a constitution and specific laws that on closer scrutiny turn out not to be laws at all, because they can be interpreted in any way to the advantage of the rulers.”¹⁰⁸

Accordingly, when considering measures against Iran (such as banning the IRGC) that may appear to infringe on the political “sanctity” of its constitutional framework, Canadian lawmakers should bear in mind that this Constitution is a mission statement for a theologically premised global movement that promotes terrorism, the violation of international law and the destruction of the international order. A Constitution which inherently denies the legitimacy of other states and religions, seeks their destruction or submission, and whose constitutional agencies are openly mandated to propagate that ideology, should not be granted the protections and legitimacy it does not afford to others. Given its thoroughly unique nature, taking appropriate measures like banning the IRGC would therefore not set a precedent for anything else other than sanctioning other state entities which have moved *completely* beyond the pale. What should concern lawmakers is conferring upon Iran’s constitutional framework a juridical legitimacy it does not deserve, thereby further empowering Iran and setting a precedent that will handcuff lawmakers in the future who may face other extraordinary threats of this sort.

3. The IRGC Defined: Not Just a Military Organization

“Never solely a military organization in the traditional sense”¹⁰⁹

Even assuming that Iran's constitutional framework is legitimate, the contention that the IRGC is a branch of the armed forces of Iran should not present an obstacle to listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity under the *Criminal Code* provisions.

A. The IRGC Cannot be Considered a Typical National Armed Forces

There is much debate as to what the IRGC actually is and how to define it. Its involvement in combat roles similar to those of the armed forces of Iran or any other country is not in question. But this military function is not fully representative of the IRGC's mandate, activities or identity – either as formally designated or as self proclaimed. The IRGC is unique among state structures insofar as it is defined by its lack of definitional and legal limitations, allowing it to be many things concurrently – thereby rendering it something other than just a branch of Iran's armed forces. A closer examination of the IRGC's mandate, the mechanisms that govern its implementation and the scope of its activities bears this out:

i. An Ideological Mandate

The IRGC only came into existence in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. It was not a revolutionary army similar to the ALN in Algeria or the Vietcong in Vietnam. It was not an existing fighting force that was co-opted or merged into the conventional military structures in the aftermath of a successful revolution.¹¹⁰ The IRGC was established after the Revolution as the ideological guard for the nascent revolutionary regime.¹¹¹ In Article 150 of the Constitution, the IRGC is given the task of

“protecting the revolution and its achievements.”¹¹² The IRGC itself has summarized its role, defining the two main tasks of the IRGC as “guarding the principle of government by the Supreme Jurist and the principle of jihad.”¹¹³ This is hardly a normative military mandate in any conventional sense of the word. Nowhere does the Constitution define the enemies against which the IRGC is obliged to guard the revolution. It is even unclear whether the IRGC's primary role is to be a defense against external threats (in which case it should act as an army) or internal threats (in which it might act as a police force).¹¹⁴ Notably, the initial structure and operational behavior of the IRGC indicates that this body was never intended to be a normative military institution. At its inception it numbered only a modest 10,000 men, dedicated primarily to restoring order in the country and dampening counter-revolutionary trends in Iran.¹¹⁵ Indeed, many of its initial activities had less to do with fighting to defend the new order, and more to do with guarding key personnel of the new regime, monitoring citizens' activities, enforcing the Islamic dress code, and seizing material not favored by the regime.¹¹⁶ Even when it did act in a military capacity shortly after its inception, the IRGC's military theory and practice deviated from most (if not all) norms of conventional military thinking. This is reflective of a *sui generis* ideological mandate as opposed to a normative military mandate. This was clearly evident during the Iran-Iraq War.¹¹⁷

ii. An Ever Expansive Mandate

Although the IRGC evolved into, among other things, a more formal military force as a result of the Iran-Iraq War,¹¹⁸ the IRGC was not tasked originally with the conventional military role of defending the territory of the Islamic Republic. Rather, that was left to Iran's conventional military forces in Article 143.¹¹⁹ The IRGC was charged primarily with protecting not Iran's people or borders, but the Revolution and its ideals. It is precisely this separation of purpose, both in mandate and practice, which existed from the adoption of the Constitution and makes the IRGC a unique institution and an all pervasive entity in the enforcement and propagation of the regime's policies both domestically and globally.¹²⁰ This mandate is far too expansive for any normative military body. It is almost borderless, essentially allowing the IRGC to take on whatever role is necessary to “protect the revolution”.¹²¹ As described in a recent report from the RAND Corporation:

[The IRGC] has evolved well beyond its original foundations as an ideological guard... Today, the IRGC functions as an expansive socio-political-economic conglomerate whose influence extends into virtually every corner of Iranian political life and society... [It should be viewed] less as a traditional military entity wielding a navy, ground forces, air force, and a clandestine paramilitary wing...and more as a domestic actor.... [t]he IRGC may be more profitably viewed as a deeply entrenched domestic institution. Arguably, this internal role overshadows its significance as a purely military force.¹²²

The IRGC was never established as conventional armed forces and has not acted as such. The military aspect is just one dimension and expression of the very broad ideological mandate that has grown to include: a vast industrial enterprise; the running and controlling of elections; the enforcement of Islamic dress codes; and the owning and running of prisons, hospitals universities and eye clinics. The IRGC's commander in chief, Maj.-Gen. Ali Jafari, seems to concur: “[the IRGC] is not solely a military organization” but “also a political and ideological organization.”¹²³ **Defining the IRGC as a “branch of the armed forces” of another country is a true misnomer. It is more like Hizbullah or Hamas, which are ideologically-based organizations that develop military, social and cultural capacities to advance their ideological agenda. Like so many other facets of Iran's infrastructure and policy, the IRGC is *sui generis* and defies any single definition.** Mohsen Sazegara, a prominent Iranian dissident presently a fellow at Harvard and a founding member of the IRGC, put it as follows: “I don't

know of any other organization in any country like the Revolutionary Guards. It's something like the Communist Party, the KGB, a business complex and the mafia.”¹²⁴

Why should Canadian policy makers protect the IRGC from being listed as a terrorist entity when the organization itself and the Constitution mandating its existence clearly do not limit or define the IRGC as being a normative military entity? It is an error to be handcuffed by conventional terminology about the armed forces of other nation states when formulating policy related to the IRGC.

B. Is the IRGC a State Actor?

i. The IRGC – Rogue or State Agent?

As this paper has demonstrated, there are substantive arguments for listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity even if it is considered a state actor. But should the IRGC in fact be viewed as a state actor? This has been a subject of debate, with the IRGC being described alternately as acting in both rogue and state capacities. Neither categorization is accurate.¹²⁵ Although the IRGC is clearly part of the formal governmental structure of Iran and constitutionally answerable to the Supreme Leader, the IRGC often acts autonomously, remaining largely unaccountable politically, financially and legally¹²⁶ for its actions.

Ultimately, it must be argued that given the level of operational control, independence from government hierarchy, and economic self sufficiency,¹²⁷ the IRGC has more than sufficient autonomy from government control and accountability to be considered a non-state actor for the purposes of listing it as a terrorist entity in Canada. Like any terrorist organization, it is an ideologically driven entity that engages in acts of terrorism on its own volition. The fact that the IRGC also executes other tasks on behalf of the government does not alter that fact. It simply makes it into a hybrid that has more accurately been described by James Russell¹²⁸ and others as a quasi-governmental organization.¹²⁹ Quasi-governmental entities (which also include quasi non-governmental entities) have been the subject of research, and in a Congressional Research Service report they are defined as hybrid organizations that have been assigned by law or by general practice some of the legal characteristics of both the government and private sectors.¹³⁰ But given its *sui generis* mandate and the breadth and depth of the IRGC's power and autonomy, it would fall into a category of quasi-governmental or non-governmental organization that is unlike any other. The IRGC's unusual category of agency was also the finding of U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth in *Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran* in 2006:

...the IRGC is a non-traditional instrumentality of Iran. It is the military arm of a kind of shadow government...It is similar to the Nazi party's SA organization prior to World War II. The IRGC actively supports terrorism as a means of protecting the Islamic revolution that brought the Ayatollah to power in Iran in 1979. It has its own separate funding sources...¹³¹

Other experts like Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, a world renowned expert on Hizbullah, have described the IRGC as having “semi-institutional autonomy”:

Despite attempts by Iran's clerical establishment to impose a degree of clerical control over the Pasdaran [IRGC]... [its] semi-institutional autonomy from the civilian leadership in Iran has meant that Hizb'allah

has been able to resist attempts at cooption by Iran through support of the IRGC. Attempts by Iranian political leaders to exert pressure on the IRGC contingent in Lebanon were unsuccessful...The lack of control by Iran's political leadership over IRGC support for Hizb'allah was clearly revealed.... [i]t enabled Hizb'allah to exercise a certain amount of independence, at times in violation of specific orders....¹³²

As evidenced in this quote, the IRGC's "semi-autonomy" from Iranian authority¹³³ also significantly increases IRGC culpability for the actions of terrorist organizations like Hizbullah that it supports. This "semi-autonomy" has in essence made the IRGC an independent patron of Hizbullah, whose terrorist exploits sometimes stem directly and independently from the IRGC and not from Iran. One could even conclude that given the IRGC's level of collusion with Hizbullah and its independence from Iranian authority in directing its activities, the IRGC and Hizbullah could be considered full partners of an independent terrorist entity.¹³⁴

ii. The IRGC and Political Adventurism in Iran

The IRGC's autonomy of action stems partially from the inherently complex structure of Iran's governmental system of parallel structures, in which the authority of conventional political and military institutions is checked by that of revolutionary Islamic institutions.¹³⁵ Iran's multiple power centers serve as checks upon the emergence of any power base that could rival the Supreme Leader's.¹³⁶

Lacking a single centralized political infrastructure such as "The Party" in the former communist states, Iran has developed a unique system of decision-making.¹³⁷ The government is composed of an often acrimonious brew of Revolutionary bodies, state structures, hybrid and secret societies, as well as many para-revolutionary and para-state organs.¹³⁸ It has been correctly described by Iran specialist Saïid Arjomand as a "...hydra-headed consolidation of...revolutionary power structures alongside the state bureaucracy...that has been typified as "fragmented authoritarianism".¹³⁹ This system has created a dynamic that is markedly different than the model of a classic authoritarian state with a single mass party, a centralization of terroristic policy, and near complete party control of mass communication and the economy.¹⁴⁰ The Iranian model is different. This "fragmentation" has generated a drift toward behind-the-scenes bargaining, autonomy, adventurism and ongoing tensions between competing sources of power.¹⁴¹ This dynamic is further exacerbated by the fact that revolutionary Iran has always been factionalized, composed of multiple autonomous groups committed to their own agendas¹⁴² and informal networks based on kinship¹⁴³ with a deeply entrenched "us versus them" culture within the establishment.

Iran, while viciously autocratic particularly towards those branded as *ghayr* (literally "other") or *biganeh* ("foreign"), often allows those considered to be *khodi* (literally "of our own") to say and do things that could lead to incarceration or execution if said and done by the *ghayr*.¹⁴⁴

iii. The IRGC – A Uniquely Autonomous Entity in Iran

The IRGC is uniquely autonomous within this system. The expanding autonomy of the IRGC has been described in a variety of ways:

- ❖ **Mohsen Sazegara**: “The Revolutionary Guard has been converted into a kind of... government inside the government of Iran.”¹⁴⁵ “They don't answer to anybody.”¹⁴⁶
- ❖ **Francis Fukuyama** (Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University): “...Rafsanjani and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have allowed the IRGC to grow into a semi-autonomous state-within-a-state.”¹⁴⁷
- ❖ **RAND**: An Iranian expert who addressed a RAND Corporation conference described the IRGC as “the only institution in Iran capable of both enforcing and breaching any red lines.”¹⁴⁸
- ❖ **Ali Alfoneh**¹⁴⁹ (the American Enterprise Institute): “IRGC educational Centers host the [IRGC’s] indoctrination courses and sessions...[which] amounts to asking the IRGC to supervise itself. There are no checks and balances.”¹⁵⁰
- ❖ **Robin Hughes** (deputy editor of Jane's Defense Weekly): “All the money that's coming in serves to make them the most powerful force in Iran... And what's important about that is that there is no oversight body.”¹⁵¹
- ❖ **Mehdi Khalaji** (Shiite theologian and fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy)¹⁵²: Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the Majlis [Iranian parliament] enacted legislation permitting the IRGC to use “its engineering capability in rebuilding the country’s economy.” However, no oversight body exists with the capability of supervising the Revolutionary Guards’ economic activities.¹⁵³
- ❖ **Wilfried Buchta**¹⁵⁴: Clearly the IRGC is among the most autonomous power centers in Iran and it has resisted any subordination to any civilian authority from the presidential executive to the clerical control apparatus embodied in the Supreme Leaders representatives.”¹⁵⁵
- ❖ **Douglas Farrah**: “The al Quds force is not always operating with the full knowledge or consent of the central government...”¹⁵⁶
- ❖ **Hooshang Amirahmadi** (director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University): “The actions of the [IRGC's] Quds Force are not necessarily ordered by Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Supreme Leader may not even get reports of all its actions... The Iranian government is a very loose grouping of power centers,” blurring lines of control and authority.¹⁵⁷

iv. Conclusion

In short, the IRGC has not only acted independently of government but has also acted against its institutions and directives when it has seen fit to do so. And now, having emerged as the most powerful element in Iran's ruling elite, the IRGC will become increasingly less accountable to anyone but itself.¹⁵⁸ They are now “moving to further cement their control,” says Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at the RAND Corporation. “They are making sure they control all levers of state power... We have a force now that is not only involved in politics, but is taking over politics.”¹⁵⁹ According to some experts like Abbas

Milani, director of Iranian studies at Stanford University, the IRGC's power has grown to exceed that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini to whom they are ostensibly accountable,¹⁶⁰ while others maintain that the Supreme leader is not always fully aware or in control of its activities.¹⁶¹ There have also been indications that the IRGC or at least factions within it are challenging or ignoring the Supreme Leader on a variety of issues and that a showdown between these elements and the Supreme Leader and the clerical elite is pending.¹⁶²

It should be pointed out that this autonomy of action does not lessen the culpability of the Iranian government for the IRGC's actions. The government of Iran is no different than any other terror sponsor who remains responsible for all the actions of the terrorists it supports, regardless of whether the sponsor has foreknowledge of any particular attack.

4. The IRGC in its Entirety Should be Listed as a Terrorist Entity because the IRGC Commits Terrorism

A. The IRGC in its Entirety Should be Listed, Not Ostensible Subdivisions Thereof

The IRGC in its entirety is an entity that has facilitated, supported and directly¹⁶³ committed acts that are deemed "terrorist activities" under Canadian law. The best known of the IRGC's five commands is the Qods Force. Despite its notoriety, analysts are unsure about the details of the Qods Force's operational and administrative dynamics. The Force is an integral part of the IRGC, mandated with "exporting the revolution" to other countries and responsible for many brutal terrorist attacks across the globe. Its founders were IRGC officers who had excelled in terrorist activity. For example, Ahmad Vahidi is one of several IRGC officers wanted in connection with the murderous 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Argentina.

The Force recruits its manpower from the broader ranks of the IRGC¹⁶⁴ and is hardly hermetically sealed from the IRGC from a command perspective. Some have contended that there are no essential differences between members of the Qods Force Staff and the Guard Corps General Staff. The commanders of Intelligence, Operations, and Training directorates, for instance, are among the Qods Force's key commanders.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, the Qods Force, while highly secretive, functions through embassies and other state organs within the broader rubric of the IRGC's relationship and integration with other state institutions.¹⁶⁶ In particular, the Qods Force works closely with IRGC's intelligence branch,¹⁶⁷ both of which operate abroad.¹⁶⁸

The Qods Force, estimated by many to be comprised of as little as several thousand elite troops,¹⁶⁹ represents only a portion of the IRGC's terrorist profile and capacity. The IRGC is estimated to number between 125,000 and 300,000 men.¹⁷⁰ Not only does it have another command specifically tasked with committing terrorist actions against internal "dissent" in Iran,¹⁷¹ but the organization as a whole controls, supports or has influence over a vast network of "revolutionary" bodies including militias, paramilitary organizations¹⁷² and other related entities¹⁷³ like the Basij¹⁷⁴ (which is reported by some to number in the millions)¹⁷⁵ and suicide squads (reported to number in the tens of thousands)¹⁷⁶ that are charged with the commission of terrorist acts against targets in Iran and abroad.

The establishment of the Qods Force in 1990 was neither the beginning nor the end of IRGC involvement in terror. In 1979 the IRGC organized the massacre in the Kurdish village of Naqada killing

more than 900 people mostly women and children.¹⁷⁷ Then in 1980, the IRGC was put in charge of foreign terrorists operations by Khomeini when the “department for Liberation Movements” was placed under IRGC tutelage,¹⁷⁸ and was directly involved in numerous terrorist attacks prior to 1990 including: the kidnappings of Western hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s (according to former CIA agent and TIME correspondent Robert Baer, kidnapped U.S. citizens were actually held at IRGC's Shaykh Barracks in the Baalbek)¹⁷⁹; the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983¹⁸⁰; the hijacking of Kuwait Airlines flight 221; a series of bombing in Paris in 1985-86; the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985; and the hijacking of Kuwait Airlines flight 422 in 1988. New evidence has also emerged that strengthens connections between the IRGC and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, which killed all 270 passengers.¹⁸¹ In several of the cases, family members of the victims sued Iran in U.S. courts, and the courts confirmed the IRGC's involvement in these incidents.¹⁸² Of particular note is the IRGC's direct involvement in the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1984. The *Wall Street Journal* quoted Ahmad Rezai, an Iranian defector, who confirmed that the bombers had been trained for that mission in Lebanon by IRGC officers. Mr. Rezai was uniquely positioned to know the facts: His father, Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezai, was the commander of the IRGC at the time, and the younger Rezai had accompanied his father to Lebanon to witness the training.¹⁸³

Even in the aftermath of the establishment of the Qods Force, the highest levels of the IRGC have continued to be involved in terrorism. IRGC official Maj.-General Mohsen Rezai is also among the eight whose arrest is sought by Argentina in connection to the 1994 attack on the AMIA Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires – four years *after* the founding of the Qods Force.¹⁸⁴ Another example of non-Qods IRGC personnel involved in terrorism is IRGC Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hejazi, who was recently named the new commander of logistics of the IRGC Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hejazi was sought by French officials in the 1990s, along with several other Iranian officials, in connection with a series of assassinations of Iranian dissidents.¹⁸⁵

Whatever factionalism may exist within the ranks of the IRGC,¹⁸⁶ there has been little indication that this has ever affected the organization's basic commitment to its mandate as the vanguard of the Islamic Revolution and its export to the world. With regard to the defense of the revolutionary system, there is no dispute among IRGC leaders.¹⁸⁷ The IRGC remains the spine of the present regime in Tehran,¹⁸⁸ the driving and defiant force behind Iran's nuclear arms program, and the front line of the brutal repression of dissent –including the recent arrests and purges of IRGC members sympathizing with the protests.¹⁸⁹ This unity of purpose combined with the IRGC's financial strength and independence is precisely what has made its recent consolidation of power in Iran all the more alarming. The Qods Force is therefore only one part of a mammoth IRGC terror industry, and U.S. Senator Jon Kyl was absolutely correct in stating that the IRGC as a whole must be held accountable as a terrorist entity:

[It is] like saying the Mafia isn't really responsible for what the Mafia does; it is only their hit men. The Qods Force is the group of hit men for this entity. This entity is clearly the overall entity responsible for this action, and it is the entity that engages in the economic activity which supplies the financial resources to the Qods Force.¹⁹⁰

B. The IRGC – Terrorism and the Nuclear Threat

The IRGC as a whole stands at the helm of Iran's nuclear procurement efforts. The UNSCR resolutions have listed high-ranking IRGC personnel for their involvement in these programs, including the deputy commander of the IRGC, the chief of the IRGC joint staff, the commanders of IRGC ground forces, and the commander of the IRGC Navy.¹⁹¹ The EU has expanded on the UN list, adding other IRGC personnel to its list of banned entities involved in nuclear proliferation.¹⁹² Given that terrorism, both as tactic and ethic, is at the core of the IRGC's ideology and modus operandi, the IRGC's nuclear violations cannot be categorized as an independent issue divorced from the organization's strategic commitment to terrorism. For the IRGC, these are simply two sides of a single strategic coin. This must be reflected in Canadian policy. The first critical step to this end is to deprive the IRGC of the privileges and legitimacy afforded to normative state entities, which it clearly does not deserve. Doing so will not lessen Iranian government responsibility for the IRGC's actions, but will frame this issue as the unique problem it actually is. For unlike the Cold War in which the nuclear threats were essentially of an interstate nature, the nuclear threat from Iran is most ominous because of the possibility of terrorist acquisition of nuclear capability through the IRGC or one of its affiliated agencies like MOIS (MOIS has always been an important conduit for IRGC activity and is staffed largely by IRGC personnel). This is of grave concern given: the IRGC's use of terrorist proxies as an essential component of its strategic calculus; the adherence of many of its senior cadres to the apocalyptic theology of the Hojatieah; and the promise of President Ahmadinejad, an extreme Mahdist and the IRGC's best known alumnus, to share Iran's nuclear technology with other Muslim elements.

In short, the Iranian nuclear peril may be the single greatest terrorist threat the world has known to date – and it is an error not to declare it as such by listing the IRGC as the terrorist entity and illegitimate force that it is. Listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity is an opportunity to employ a “smart” sanction that targets the nerve centre of Iran's nuclear, terrorist and human rights abuses in one single blow while minimizing the impact on Iran's broader population.¹⁹³ Canada has already agreed in principle to this type of approach in its support of UNSCR 1737, which stipulates that member states “shall freeze the funds or other financial assets and economic resources... that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex.” In other words, by virtue of listing the head of the IRGC (and the head of its air force), the UN has empowered – and arguably has required – member states to take the necessary actions to freeze IRGC funds and financial assets.¹⁹⁴ Although UNSCR 1737 has been viewed by pundits as ineffective and toothless, this would begin to change if the IRGC were to be listed in Canada and other Western states as a terrorist entity.

Appendix 1

The IRGC as a Global Terrorist Threat

Europe – Europe's intelligence community is monitoring about 800 Iran-backed Hizbullah terrorists residing in Germany, along with sleeper cells and operatives in: **Belgium, Bosnia, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.**¹⁹⁵ A recent report issued by Germany's security services says Hizbullah could launch damaging terrorist attacks in **Germany, the UK** and elsewhere in Europe.¹⁹⁶ British authorities also confirmed recently that Hizbullah cells throughout the UK are threatening to strike should Iran be attacked.¹⁹⁷

Africa – Hizbullah has been proactively engaged in financial, logistical, and operational activity across Africa. It has utilized Africa as a strategic base to raise and launder funds, recruit operatives, collect intelligence and engage in criminal enterprises. Hizbullah has “fundraising” operations in the **Ivory Coast, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), and South Africa.**¹⁹⁸

Hizbullah is also believed to raise significant funds by dealing in “conflict diamonds” in **Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo**, a practice al-Qaeda has reportedly copied using the model and contacts established by Hizbullah.¹⁹⁹

In recent years, many foreign students, including those from **Uganda** and other African countries, have been sent to study theology in Iranian universities as a means of being recruited and trained as Hizbullah operatives or Iranian intelligence agents.²⁰⁰ INTERPOL has also identified cocaine-trafficking rings in West Africa that use their proceeds to finance activities of the FARC and Hizbullah.²⁰¹

Iran has signed a strategic alliance with **Eritrea** that grants IRGC units basing rights in Eritrea. As for **Somalia**, Iran has been exploiting its condition as a failed state for several years.²⁰²

In 2006, the UN reported that some 720 Somali jihadists aligned with al-Qaeda fought with Hizbullah during its war against Israel. Tehran has equipped the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Courts Union (ICU) regime in **Somalia** with weapons. The UN report also linked the ICU to Iran's nuclear program.²⁰³ Under the guise of humanitarian assistance, Iran is now also active in the **Comoros islands.**²⁰⁴

Latin America – Under Ahmadinejad, the Iranian government pursued a sustained effort to reach out to Latin American countries. Using billions of dollars in aid and assistance, Ahmadinejad has worked to create an anti-American bloc with **Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.**²⁰⁵

Venezuela – The cornerstone of Ahmadinejad's Latin America policy is **Venezuela.**²⁰⁶ Venezuela's military alliance with Iran places Iranian military personnel and Hizbullah operatives at every level of Venezuela's military, intelligence and law enforcement establishment. For example, as the Washington-based Center for Security Policy's Western Hemispheric Security Project documented in a recent report, Hizbullah agents control Venezuela's passport agency. In 2003, Chavez appointed Tarek el-Aissami, a

known Hizbullah member, to head the country's passport agency. Last year, Aissami was promoted to serve as Minister of Interior and Justice. Last June, the US Department of Treasury designated Ghazi Nasr al Din, a Venezuelan diplomat who served as the deputy ambassador in Damascus and Beirut, as a Hizbullah agent.²⁰⁷

Venezuela's Margarita Island is a popular tourist spot for orthodox Islamists. Eighty percent of businesses on Margarita Island are owned by the Arab population on the island. In the past several years, many of these businesses and business owners have been found to have ties to illicit activities, money laundering, and the BMPE. (The BMPE is a process used by drug smugglers in Venezuela and Colombia as well as other Latin American states to clean drug money.)²⁰⁸ In 2003, an analyst visiting the island described it as a fortress with armed guards outside. Margarita Island seems to be the center of a “terrorist financial network stretching throughout the **Caribbean to Panama and the Cayman Islands.**”²⁰⁹

Argentina – During the 1990s, Hizbullah and Iran’s terrorist networks in Argentina were used to carry out two mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires: the bombing of the Israeli embassy in 1992, which killed 29 Israelis and Argentineans and wounded over 220 people, and the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center building in 1994, in which 83 people were murdered and 330 were injured. There is conclusive evidence of direct linkage between the Iranian leadership and the IRGC's Qods Force in the bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Argentina that killed 85 people and wounded 151 others. On Oct. 25, 2006, Argentina's State Prosecutor issued international arrest warrants for Rafsanjani, Velayati, and Fallahiyan, as well as former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezai, commander of the Qods special operations unit Ahmad Vahidi, and Imad Fayaz Moughnieh, who headed the external security service of Iran's proxy Hizbullah that was found to be directly responsible for carrying out the attack.¹¹ The Argentine indictment also asserted that the AMIA terror attack was approved by supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who was not named in the arrest warrant due to his status as a clerical leader.²¹⁰

Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay – According to the US military's Southern Command, Hizbullah in Latin America earns between \$300-500 million per year through illegal activity. This dwarfs the \$100-\$200 million a year it receives from Iran²¹¹. Hizbullah is active in the tri-border area of Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay, particularly the city of Ciudad del Este. The area has long been one of the world’s largest black markets and a haven for organized crime and terrorism.²¹² Research from the RAND Corporation described the locale as the “most important center for financing Islamic terrorism outside the Middle East.”²¹³

Nicaragua – Since 2007, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega has facilitated a massive expansion of Iran's presence in Central America. With more than a hundred accredited diplomats, Iran's embassy in Managua is one of the largest diplomatic compounds in the world. In 2007, Iran and Venezuela announced they were investing \$350 million to build a deep water port at Nicaragua's Monkey Point along the Caribbean Sea. Iran also announced its plans to upgrade Nicaragua's Pacific Port of Corinto. Finally, Tehran announced it would build a dry canal connecting the two ports. Such a building scheme would enable Iran to evade the Panama Canal, build its own military infrastructure within the ports themselves, and freely camouflage military ships as civilian maritime traffic. Whether there is any reality to Iran building this canal is doubtful, but the initiative does show the global scale of Iran’s ambitions.²¹⁴

Hizbullah Franchises in Latin America – Like Hizbullah Venezuela, there are similar networks in other Latin American countries, but their activity is limited. Such networks include Hizbullah Argentina, Hizbullah El Salvador, Hizbullah Chile, Hizbullah Colombia, etc. They maintain close relations with local Shi'ite Muslim communities and with the Iranian regime. Examination of the Hizbullah Argentina website shows that it is different from Hizbullah Venezuela: while Hizbullah Venezuela has its source in extremist, revolutionary radical left-wing ideology, the Argentinean network seems to include radical right-wing as well as populist elements.²¹⁵

Mexico – Mexico, which does not follow a pro-Iranian policy, is also exposed to the risks of Iranian subversion. In mid-July 2008, the online edition of El Universal revealed intelligence information from the American Drug Enforcement Administration, according to which drug cartels in Mexico (GULF and SINALOA) were sending assassins to Iran for instruction in using IEDs and sniping, taught by the IRGC. The same sources said that the assassins traveled from Mexico to Venezuela, where they took the weekly Iran Air flights to Iran. In some cases, the travelers used Venezuelan passports. The newspaper further added that several Lebanese terrorists connected to Iran were granted Mexican citizenship through marriages arranged by Mexican drug gangs.²¹⁶ Law enforcement officials cited in a *Washington Times* article have stressed that Hizbullah is involved in human and drug trafficking in the South American tri-border area, but that it increasingly relies on Mexican cartels which control the smuggling routes to the US. Although they argue that the organization had yet to move terrorists across the Mexican border into the US, others have disagreed. In 2002, for instance, the US arrested a Hizbullah operative in Mexico who admitted that he had facilitated the infiltration of several hundred Hizbullah operatives into the US.²¹⁷

Bolivia and Venezuela: A Source of Uranium – According to a secret Israeli government report obtained by the Associated Press, Venezuela and Bolivia are supplying Iran with uranium for its nuclear program.²¹⁸

The IRGC Threat in the Middle East – Iran's revolutionary doctrine has generated an insatiable drive in Iran's ruling elite to establish Iran as a regional hegemonic power through subversion and terror. To this end, Iran has provided extensive logistical support and billions of dollars of capital to both Shiite and Sunni terror organizations throughout the region in a campaign to galvanize Islamist and radical forces under the Iranian banner. Iran has successfully instigated Shiite unrest and terrorist violence throughout the Gulf region in states like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE, while promoting two major conflicts with Israel through its Hizbullah and Hamas proxies. Tensions between Iran and Egypt have been high due to an Iranian-supported campaign of terror to destabilize Mubarak's government, and Morocco has also severed all ties with Iran for similar reasons.

Appendix 2

The Murder of Zahra Kazemi

- ❖ Ms. Kazemi was held in the notorious Evin Prison before being transferred to Baghiatollah al-Azam military hospital. This hospital, where Ms. Kazemi died from her injuries after being disconnected from life support (reportedly without the permission of her son or mother), is controlled by the IRGC.
- ❖ The precise sequence of events at Evin and the identity of some of the actors involved remain unclear. But it should be noted that the various wards of the Evin Prison, while formally under the control of the National Prisons Office, have effectively been handed over to the judicial authority, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. A Human Rights Watch report on the Evin Prison states that it has not been able to confirm the fluctuations of power within the prison and the actual identities of those who control the solitary cells. Some have even reported that there is always an IRGC member at all interrogations. It is therefore not inconceivable that the IRGC or its personnel may have been involved directly in Kazemi incident.
- ❖ The last 26 hours that Ms. Kazemi spent in Evin were under the control of the Ministry of Intelligence headed at that time by Mr. Ali Younsi, the former Head of the Politico-Ideological Bureau of the IRGC. Mr. Younsi was one member of a commission of inquiry charged by the Iranian government to investigate the death of Ms. Kazemi. Iranian human rights lawyer Abdol Karim Lahiji has claimed that

three of the four members of this committee, the Ministers of [Intelligence] and Justice and Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, who were fully aware of the situation from the very early hours of Zahra Kazemi's arrest because of their official political positions, not only did not intervene to stop this catastrophe, but also, with their continuous silence, allowed Saeed Mortazavi, the main suspect of this crime, to dare to order the Director-General of Foreign Press and Media at the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to announce Zahra Kazemi's death by stroke.²¹⁹

Article:
British Politicians Urge EU to Impose Sanctions Targeting Iran's IRGC

Thursday, 01 November 2007

The text of statement by the British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom:

...The British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom, a cross-party group of Parliamentarians from both Houses of Parliament, on Wednesday urged the European Union to blacklist the Iranian regime's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

In a letter to the Portuguese Prime Minister, who currently holds the EU's rotating Presidency, the cross-party Parliamentarians said: "The IRGC, which gets its orders directly from the regime's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, is in charge of much of the regime's production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including the A-bomb. It has also been involved in planning and executing more than 100 terrorist operations against foreign nationals and Iranian dissidents in virtually every continent of the world over the past 27 years. Of course, this figure significantly excludes the regime's daily terrorist activities in Iraq and Afghanistan." The group lauded the decision by the Bush administration to ban the IRGC and accuse its elite Qods Force of "supporting terrorism", describing it as a "great stride in the war against terrorism."

"The IRGC has also played a major role in suppressing dissent among an increasingly disenchanted population at home.... It has also participated in the torture of well over half a million political prisoners over the past two decades. The regime in Iran makes use of more than 174 forms of physical and psychological torture", the letter said. It added the IRGC controls a large portion of Iran's economy. "We have determined that since 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has appointed several hundred Revolutionary Guards commanders to senior Government positions including the recent instatement of Saeed Jalili as Tehran's new nuclear negotiator," it said. The U.S. decision to impose sanctions against the IRGC and the Iranian Ministry of Defence will "contribute greatly" to slashing funding for the "world's number one state sponsor of terrorism". "Our committee believes that for sanctions to have a meaningful effect, they must be multilateral. It therefore feels that it is in the interest of world peace and stability and an asset to the fight against terrorism for the European Union and in particular the United Kingdom to follow suit", the Parliamentarians said.

"We urge EU governments to impose sanctions on the IRGC and issue a ban on this institution of terror so as not to give the regime more time to build a nuclear bomb and pursue its ominous projects in the Middle East....

Note to editors:

The British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom is comprised of over 50 Members of Parliament and Peers from across the political spectrum. It has the backing of the majority of MPs and more than 200 Peers in its endeavours for human rights and democracy in Iran.

Holland votes to put Iran's RGC on EU-terror list

Nov. 27, 2009

BENJAMIN WEINTHAL, JPost correspondent in Berlin , THE JERUSALEM POST

A majority of the Netherlands parliament voted this past week to place Iran's elite military unit, the Revolutionary Guards, on the European Union (EU) terror list. The Dutch resolution appears to be the first European motion to target the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist entity. The resolution cited the IRGC's support for Hamas and Hizbullah as reasons to label the Guards as an unlawful organization fomenting terror.

A second anti-terror resolution was also passed by the Dutch parliament. That motion urges the UN-affiliated International Maritime Organization (IMO) to bar Iran from "accession" to the IMO council because of Teheran's "illegal transportation of weapons."

While the United States designated the Revolutionary Guards a global terrorist organization in 2007, European Union countries have been reluctant about clamping down on the 125,000 member military wing of the regime. The resolution will be discussed in December at an EU meeting in Brussels.

When asked if the German government plans to support the Dutch parliament motion on the EU level, a Foreign Office spokesman said, "We have a good policy of not commenting on friendly European neighbors and partners, especially resolutions of independent parliaments."

According to the resolution, the "IRGC is increasingly functioning as the most important instrument of the present regime" and "this organization has played a leading role during the bloody suppression of the recent popular protests and that it is increasingly active in facilitating international terrorism, among which support to Hamas, Hizbullah and anti-Western militias in Iraq."

The resolution urged "the Government (Dutch) to advance that the European Union places the Iranian Revolutionary Guards on the European list of terrorist organizations." A political left versus right vote split among the Dutch parties was evident, in which 80 votes from the conservative-liberal parties favoured the terror label and 70 votes from the left of center parties opposed the resolution.

Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen's Christian Democratic Party voted for the anti-IRGC resolution. The liberal and right-of-center parties-the Christian Union, the Orthodox

Protestant Christians, Gert Wilders' Party for Freedom, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy- also supported the legislation.

In contrast to the voting pattern of the liberal and conservative parties, the block of leftist parties-the Labour party, the left-wing Liberals, Greens, Socialist Party, and Party for Animals-rejected the designation of the IRGC as a terror organization.

The groundbreaking vote of the Dutch parliament has received scant attention in the European press. Critics argue that the EU's flourishing trade relationship with Teheran plays a significant factor in blocking the labelling of the Revolutionary Guards as a terror organization. Last year, the European Union did 14.1 billion euro worth of trade with Iran.

Meanwhile, the Mideast Freedom Forum Berlin is slated to discuss the role of the IRGC at its international conference "Time to Act" on Saturday and Sunday in Berlin. Israeli, German and American experts will be speaking at the event."Money, Power and Terror: The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps" is one of the panels at the event. The global terror of the IRGC and its economic system in the Islamic Republic are listed as lectures.

*** As mentioned on page 11, this was a resolution to recommend that the Dutch government and the E.U. consider listing the IRGC.

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⁸ Victor Comras is a retired career diplomat of the United States. He served, under appointment by Secretary General Kofi Annan, as one of five international monitors to oversee the implementation of Security Council measures against terrorism (al-Qaeda) and terrorism financing. Mr. Comras is a leading expert on international trade embargoes and economic sanctions, and the global effort to combat terrorism financing and money laundering. He is quoted by news media around the world and lectures frequently, and is called upon regularly to testify before the U.S. Congress on counter-terrorism and sanctions issues.

Prior to serving at the United Nations, Mr. Comras served at the U.S. State Department for 35 years until his retirement in 2001 with the permanent rank of Minister-Counselor. From 1992 to 2001, Mr. Comras held senior positions at the State Department dealing with strategic trade regulation and bilateral and international economic and financial issues. From 1992 to 1994, he was the chief U.S. architect of the international economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and directed U.S. efforts to ensure the effective international implementation and enforcement of these sanctions. In 1994, President Clinton appointed Mr. Comras as U.S. envoy to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. After serving in Macedonia, from 1997 to 1998, Mr. Comras served as senior advisor to Undersecretary Eizenstat in the negotiations related to restitution for World War II (Holocaust) survivors and he helped negotiate major related agreements with several countries. Between 1999 and 2001, Mr. Comras served as Director for Canadian Affairs at the State Department, and subsequently as a Special Advisor to the Secretary of State, during which time, Secretary Albright appointed Mr. Comras to lead the development and implementation of the multilateral economic (mainly financial) sanctions imposed against Serbia in 1999; and Secretary Powell charged him to lead the U.S. initiative to re-energize economic sanctions against Iraq. Mr. Comras' other diplomatic assignments have included postings in South Africa, France, and Canada; and he has represented the United States before the European Union, the United Nations, the Council of Europe and COCOM. He is a recipient of 10 Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards from the Department of State and the President's Medal from the Council of Europe.

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¹⁰ Patrick Clawson is deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author or editor of twenty-five books and monographs, including *The Last Resort: Consequences of Preventive Military Action Against Iran* (The Washington Institute, 2008, with Michael Eisenstadt).

Dr. Clawson has authored more than seventy articles about the Middle East and international economics, appears frequently on television and radio, and has published op-ed articles in major newspapers including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. He has also testified before congressional committees more than twenty times and has been an expert witness in more than a dozen federal cases. He speaks Persian and French. Prior to joining The Washington Institute,

he spent five years as senior research professor at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies and four years each at the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

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Policy initiatives to address Iranian nuclear ambitions must give careful consideration to the depth and pervasiveness of the religious and political convictions of Iran's ruling elites. The Islamic Republic of Iran is an ideologically based regime committed to pursuing the principles and goals of the Islamic Revolution as articulated by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, who perceived Iran as a nation with a mission – “to export our revolution to the whole world” and “to establish an Islamic state worldwide.” The regime's foreign policy initiatives stem from deeply held beliefs of a conspiratorial West seeking Iran's demise and the conviction that Iran is the true and rightful heir to the leadership of the entire Muslim *Ummah*.

The theological and revolutionary zeal of Iran's clerical elite has now taken an even more extreme turn with the ascendance of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Mr. Ahmadinejad and his supporters subscribe to an apocalyptic theology in which facilitating a clash of civilizations between the Islamic world and the West would hasten the messianic revelation required for establishing Islam's ultimate dominion on Earth. The apocalyptic expectation that the Imam will manifest himself in the context of major inter-religious conflict is a critical factor that potentially distorts any normal strategic calculus.

Also see “Can a Nuclear Iran Be Contained or Deterred?” by Michael Rubin | AEI Online, (November 2008): “At its core, the Islamic Republic is an ideological regime with a mission to export its revolution embedded both in its constitution and in the IRGC structure. The preamble to the Islamic Republic's constitution, for example, states that “the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps . . . will be responsible not only for guarding and preserving the frontiers of the country, but also for fulfilling the ideological mission of God's way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God's law throughout the world.” See Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 154; and Wilfried Buchta, *Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), 69; and “Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, preamble quoted in <http://www.aei.org/outlook/28896>; and February 1979 (according to Dilip Hiro in *The Longest War* p.32) p.108 from *Excerpts from Speeches and Messages of Imam Khomeini on the Unity of the Muslims*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_thought_and_legacy_of_Khomeini#cite_note-74#cite_note-74; see also *Resalat*, 25.3.1988,

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⁶⁶ *Liberal*, Newsroom, "Liberals call for terrorist designation of Iranian group", December 4, 2009, http://www.liberal.ca/en/newsroom/media-releases/17059_liberals-call-for-terrorist-designation-of-iranian-group.

⁶⁷ From a prayer sermon in Tehran, October 7, 1984, quoted in Amir Taheri, *The Persian Night*, (New York 2003), P. 251.

⁶⁸ Three decades ago, Moshen Sazegara quit his studies at the University of Illinois to join Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's return from exile to lead Iran's Islamic revolution. A close aide to Ayatollah Khomeini, Mr. Sazegara was a founder of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, but an eventual falling-out with the clerical regime sent him back to the United States as an exile. Today, he has become a global leader for Iranian dissidents who have risen up in opposition to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the clerics who have endorsed his disputed re-election. Mr. Sazegara's image now appears on many Iranians' computer screens every day, all over the world, against a green background seared with a V for victory sign.... Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, used Mr. Sazegara as one of his closest advisers. As Iran bubbled in pre-revolutionary fervor in 1978, Mr. Sazegara dropped out of school and flew to Paris to join the Ayatollah, translating his speeches for an English-speaking audience. Once Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran, Mr. Sazegara became a close aide and set up the Revolutionary Guard, an ideological army entrusted with safeguarding the principles of the revolution. But in an example of revolutions devouring their children, he was arrested in 2003 and fled to the United States soon after his release. He remains one of the highest-ranking Islamic Republic officials ever to have switched sides. Now, he is using his inside knowledge in hopes of hastening the collapse of the same Islamic republic he helped build....

Meanwhile, Mr. Sazegara continues preaching his message of nonviolent action on a nightly basis. Drawing direct parallels with popular uprisings in countries such as Serbia, he advises protesters to reclaim public spaces by flooding them with green colors or spray-painting V signs on every surface. "Debate every Sepahi [Revolutionary Guard] who lives in your neighborhood or attends the local mosque," Mr. Sazegara advised in a recent broadcast. "If you find him unflinching in his support of the regime, then speak to his family, ask them why the Sepah are killing our protesters, write this on the walls of their house or stick posters of martyrs on their front doors." It is only such unrelenting pressure, Mr. Sazegara said, that will force the regime's hand. "Ayatollah Khamenei tried to persuade people that his power is absolutely strong while they are absolutely weak - the two-absolutes theory," Mr. Sazegara said in a telephone interview. "The two absolutes have now been broken, and we now have problems to persuade the young generation from getting violent and attacking the police forces." From "Khomeini Ally Now Leads Iran Dissidents", by Jason Athanasiadis, *Washington Times*, August 17, 2009, <http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/17/khomeini-ally-now-leads-iran-dissidents/>

⁶⁹ "The Evolution of Iran's Revolutionary Guard", by Renee Montagne, *NPR*, April 5, 2007. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9371072>.

⁷⁰ RAND, National Defense Research Institute, *The Rise of the Pasdaran – Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*, 2009, P. xi and xii.

⁷¹ "The Revolutionary Guards Role in Iranian Politics", by Ali Alfoneh, *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1, 2008.

⁷² Dr. Bruce Tefft, from his testimony in *Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261, 272 (D.D.C. 2005). Dr. Tefft served 21 years in the CIA, including 17 years abroad, many as a CIA Chief of Station; and was a founding member

of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center in 1985. He has more than 30 years experience in foreign affairs, intelligence and security operations and counter-terrorism. In addition to extensive research and teaching of counter-terrorism methods and techniques, he has also developed course material for Bachelor and Master-level degree programs in Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism. Dr. Tefft has been certified as an "expert witness" on terrorism issues for the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. and has testified in 8 cases.

⁷³ Taheri 102.

⁷⁴ Ibid. 162.

⁷⁵ February 11, 1979 (according to Dilip Hiro in *The Longest War* p.32) p.108 from *Excerpts from Speeches and Messages of Imam Khomeini on the Unity of the Muslims*. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_thought_and_legacy_of_Khomeini#cite_note-74#cite_note-74.

⁷⁶ *Resalat*, 25.3.1988) (quoted in *The Constitution of Iran* by Asghar Schirazi, Tauris, 1997, p.69), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_thought_and_legacy_of_Khomeini#cite_note-74#cite_note-74, see also Personal communications from Dr. Mansur Farhang, a biographer and supporter of Khomeini who was the former Iranian representative at the United Nations, with Ervand Abrahamian. Quoted in Abrahamian, Ervand, *Khomeinism : Essays on the Islamic Republic* University of California Press, (1993). [http://econnoisseur.net/index.php?option=com_awiki&view=mediawiki&Itemid=42&article=Interventionism_\(politics\)#cite_note-3](http://econnoisseur.net/index.php?option=com_awiki&view=mediawiki&Itemid=42&article=Interventionism_(politics)#cite_note-3).

⁷⁷ Khomeini's first Iranian New Years speech, FBIS, March 24, 1980 quoted in *After Khomeini – The Iranian Second Republic*, by Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Routledge, 2003.

⁷⁸ “Contending with Iran's Sponsorship of Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation”, 2009 International Counterterrorism Conference, featuring Matthew Levitt, September 9, 2009; http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/09/contending_with_irans_sponsors.php.

⁷⁹ Ibid. P. 101.

⁸⁰ Ibid. P. 99.

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 99.

⁸² Ibid. P.97.

⁸³ Ibid P.98.

⁸⁴ “Contending with Iran's Sponsorship of Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation”, 2009 International Counterterrorism Conference, featuring Matthew Levitt, September 9, 2009; http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/09/contending_with_irans_sponsors.php.

⁸⁵ "Canadian Maple Leaf No Longer Protection; Arab Warning Due to Hezbollah Ban", *The Washington Times*, January 20, 2003.

⁸⁶ Arjomand, Said Amir, *After Khomeini, Iran Under His Successor*, Oxford University Press P. 29.

⁸⁷ Ibid. P.26.

⁸⁸ Ibid. P. 27.

⁸⁹ See Shmuel Bar, “Iranian Terrorist Policy and ‘Export of Revolution’”, from The Ninth Annual Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel's National Security and Resilience, February 2009.

<http://www.herzliyaconference.org/Uploads/2903Iranian.pdf>; also see “Can a Nuclear Iran Be Contained or Deterred?” By Michael Rubin, November 2008, <http://www.aei.org/outlook/28896>: “At its core, the Islamic Republic is an ideological regime with a mission to export its revolution embedded both in its constitution and in the IRGC structure...” quoting the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 154; and Wilfried Buchta, *Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), 69; and “Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, preamble.

⁹⁰ Article 3.16; “... framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the freedom fighters [*mustad’afun*] of the world; also see Article 154: “...[the IRI] supports the just struggles of the freedom fighters [*mustad’afun*] against the oppressors [*mutsakbirun*] in every corner of the globe”; also see the Constitution’s preamble: “Accordingly, the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps are to be organized in conformity with this goal, and they will be responsible not only for guarding and preserving the frontiers of the country, but also for fulfilling the ideological mission of jihad in God's way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God's law throughout the world (this is in accordance with the Koranic verse “*Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and strings of horses, striking fear into the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them*”[8:60] and “With due attention to the Islamic content of the Iranian Revolution, the Constitution provides the necessary basis for ensuring the continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad. In particular, in the development of international relations, the Constitution will strive with other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for the formation of a single world community (in accordance with the Koranic verse “*This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me*”[21:92]), and to assure the continuation of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the world.

⁹¹ February 11, 1979, (according to Dilip Hiro in *The Longest War* p.32) p.108 from *Excerpts from Speeches and Messages of Imam Khomeini on the Unity of the Muslims*. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_thought_and_legacy_of_Khomeini#cite_note-74#cite_note-74.

⁹² *Resalat*, March 3, 1988, (quoted in *The Constitution of Iran* by Asghar Schirazi, Tauris, 1997, p.69), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_thought_and_legacy_of_Khomeini#cite_note-74#cite_note-74; see also personal communications from Dr. Mansur Farhang, a biographer and supporter of Khomeini who was the former Iranian representative at the United Nations, with Ervand Abrahamian. Quoted in Abrahamian, Ervand, *Khomeinism : Essays on the Islamic Republic* University of California Press, (1993). [http://econnoisseur.net/index.php?option=com_awiki&view=mediawiki&Itemid=42&article=Interventionism_\(politics\)#cite_note-3](http://econnoisseur.net/index.php?option=com_awiki&view=mediawiki&Itemid=42&article=Interventionism_(politics)#cite_note-3); also see “Thesis – Iranian Foreign Policy – Battleground of Domestic Factional Politics: Implication for US Policy?”, by David Richard Toni, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 1998, P.18, quoting Khomeini: “We will export our revolution to the four comers of the world because our revolution is Islamic, and the struggle will continue until the cry of *La ilaha illa 'llah* (there is no God but Allah) and *wa Muhammad rasul-ullah*(and Muhammad is the messenger of God) prevails throughout the world.”; and another quote from Khomeini: “... in our domestic and foreign policy, ... we have set as our goal the world-wide spread of the influence of Islam ... We wish to cause the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and Communism to wither throughout the world. We wish, as does God almighty, to destroy the systems which are based on these three foundations, and to promote the Islamic order of the Prophet ...” quoted in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_thought_and_legacy_of_Khomeini#cite_note-74#cite_note-74.

⁹³ Byman, Daniel “Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Center for Peace and Security Studies Georgetown University Washington, DC, USA, and Saban Center for Middle East Policy Brookings Institution, 2008, P. quoting from Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *After Khomeini* (New York: Routledge, 1995),p. 131.

⁹⁴ Rafsanjani to Iranian TV, August 23, 1994, quoted in Shmuel Bar, "Iranian Terrorist Policy and "Export of Revolution", from *The Ninth Annual Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel's National Security and Resilience*, February 2009, <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/Uploads/2903Iranian.pdf>.

⁹⁵ “Foremost among the responsibilities stemming from its self-proclaimed status as pathfinder and model is solidarity with oppressed Muslims everywhere. This is a core value of the revolution rather than a vital security interest, but it is an important part of Islamic Iran’s sense of legitimacy and one of the few areas in which the regime can claim to be principled and unique.”⁹⁵ Quoted in *Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring NBC Use of NBC Weapons*, by Paula Desutter, University Press of the Pacific, 2002, Chapter 3, <http://www.ecampus.com/book/9780898758795> quoting Chubin, Shahram. "Iran's Strategic Aims and Constraints." In *Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities*. Ed., Patrick Clawson. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994, P. 13.

⁹⁶ Taheri P.56.

⁹⁷ Ibid. P.55.

⁹⁸ For more on Khomeini’s campaign to eradicate Iranian identity and supplant it with an Islamic identity see Taheri Chapter 6.

⁹⁹ Taheri, P. 299.

¹⁰⁰ See fn. 89; also President Machmoud Achmadinejad: "Our mission in the arena of foreign affairs is to present the idea of Pure Islam as the only path for the salvation of mankind to all other nations. We have to smash the existing models in the world" quoted on Taheri P. 139; also see fn 85-88 above; also see Ayatollah Khomeini quoted in Ann Elisabeth Mayer, "War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law," in *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, eds. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (New York: Greenwood Press), P. 206: "Our war is one of ideology and does not recognize borders or geography. We must ensure the vast mobilization of the soldiers of Islam around the world in our ideological war..."", quoted in "Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons", Chapter 3, by Paula A. Desutter, University Press of the Pacific, 4.1.2002

¹⁰¹ See fn. 95.

¹⁰² Arjomand, *After Khomeini, Iran Under His Successors*, P.30 and 42..

¹⁰³ The preamble to the *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Qom: Center for Islamic Publications, 1979), p. 9. notes: "Based on the principle of the Guardianship of the Islamic State and the leadership of the Muslim Nation, the Constitution provides a basis for the leadership of a fully qualified *faqih* whom the people consider as leader, to ensure that no institution deviates from its Islamic mandate." Principle 4 elaborates on the mechanism by which the...*faqih* has universal jurisdiction, providing quasi, legal justification to the supremacy of the *vali's* will over the law. "All civil, penal, monetary, cultural, military, and political laws must be based on the Islamic principles."¹³ Naturally, the interpretation of what is or is not an "Islamic principle" falls within the authority of the *faqih* and the Council of Guardians, another body of mullahs appointed by the *vali*. Despite the superficial separation of the three branches of government, the constitution delegates their control entirely to the *faqih*. Principle 57 says: "The legislative, executive, and judicial branches in the Islamic Republic of Iran are under the supervision of the *vali-e-faqih* and the Imam of the Islamic *ummah*." **Since supreme religious and political authority rests in the hands of one person, the Imam's power far exceeds that of any contemporary head of state.** Quoted in *The Pillars of the Mullahs' Rule*, <http://islamic-fundamentalism.info/chII.htm>.

¹⁰⁴ Ahmad Azari-Qomi, a senior conservative cleric quoted in *Ressalat*, Tehran, 15 August 1988, quoted in *The Pillars of the Mullahs' Rule*, <http://islamic-fundamentalism.info/chII.htm>. On Khomeini's instructions, Azari-Qomi defined the theoretical basis of such absolute rule in a series of newspaper editorials.

¹⁰⁵ Taheri 228; also see *The Pillars of the Mullahs' Rule*, <http://islamic-fundamentalism.info/chII.htm>:

...[i]n January 1988, the incumbent president and future *vali-e-faqih*, Ali Khamenei, said in a Friday prayer sermon that "governmental authority is contained within the bounds of divine edicts," Khomeini lambasted his protégé in an open letter:

...Such an interpretation of my words - that the government's authority is limited by divine edicts - totally contradicts my statements. If the government's authority were bound by secondary commandments, I would have to say that the divine rule and absolute authority conferred upon the Prophet would be devoid of meaning and content. . . . I should point out that governing is one dimension of the absolute authority of the Prophet's *velayat-e-faqih*. It is one of Islam's primary decrees, and takes precedence over all secondary commandments, even prayer, fasting, and the hajj. . . . The *vali-e-faqih* is empowered to unilaterally abrogate the religious commitments he has undertaken with the people should he find them contrary to the interests of the nation and Islam. He can ban any religious or non-religious matter contrary to the interests of Islam. . . . The statements made, or being made, derive from a lack of knowledge of divinely ordained absolute rule.

¹⁰⁶ "How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran's Economy?", by Ali Alfoneh, AEI Online, October 2007, <http://www.aei.org/outlook/26991>.

¹⁰⁷ The IRGC essentially sets its own boundaries, see fn. 90 and 174.; for more specifically on the IRGC's illicit economic activities, control of imports and customs functions see fn. 36; the IRGC has also taken over the running of Iran's elections, closed down Tehran's airport in order to prevent the government from fulfilling its contract with a Turkish company to run the facility (the IRGC wants to maintain its control of illegal imports and customs collection), has threatened to overthrow the government, and has also threatened to assassinate then Iranian President Khatami for his suspension of Iran's nuclear program and then Rafsanjani for his support for ending the Iran-Iraq War.

¹⁰⁸ http://www.sazegara.net/english/archives/2007/05/iranian_rights_abuses_systemic.html

¹⁰⁹ *The Rise of the Pasdaran – Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*, RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2009, Chapter 1, P. 25.

¹¹⁰ Taheri, P.244.

¹¹¹ *The Rise of the Pasdaran – Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*, P. xi.

¹¹² "The Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran," Sec. Three, quoted in "The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics", by Ali Alfoneh, *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1, 2008.

¹¹³ *Payam-e Enghelab* [the official organ of the IRGC], July 25, 1981, quoted in "The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics", by Ali Alfoneh, *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1, 2008.

¹¹⁴ "The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics", by Ali Alfoneh, *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1, 2008.

¹¹⁵ Byman, Daniel, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Jerrold Green, *Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era*, RAND, 2001, P.33.

¹¹⁶ "Iran: Defending the Islamic Revolution – The Corps of the Matter", by Houchang Hassan-Yari, *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty* 2009; and *ibid*.

¹¹⁷ See Katzman, Kenneth, *The Warriors of Islam, Iran's Revolutionary Guards*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), P. 148, "The Guard fails to meet the substantive criteria of professionalism – unquestioned obedience to civilian authority, absence of political involvement, and a scientifically based decision making process. The Guard's resistance to professionalism in turn,

reflects the depth and strength of the Guard's continuing commitment to the hard line ideological principles of the revolution, which are incompatible with the scientific and politically neutral foundations of military professionalism.”; and also Katzman P.55 “The IRGC places tremendous emphasis on ideological correctness. Its approach during the Iran/Iraq war, for example, was that “a *maktab* (ideologically pure) army is better than a victorious one.”; and Kazzman P. 131 “Ideological correctness and commitment to the revolution led in earlier years to its undertaking high-risk military operations “rich in ideological content but militarily ill advised and potentially detrimental to the Guards' own military posture and prestige.”

¹¹⁸ Daniel Byman, *Iran’s Security in the Post Revolutionary Era*, P.34.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* P.xii.

¹²⁰ “Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – An Open Source Analysis”, Mathew M. Frick, *Joint Force Quarterly* 49, 2nd Quarter 2008, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm.

¹²¹ See “The Militarization of Iran’s Politics”, *Islamic Affairs Analyst*, August 2008, ”www.jiaa.jans.com, regarding the open-ended mandate for political involvement in the IRGC’s statute passed on September 6, 1982.

¹²² *The Rise of the Pasdaran – Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*, P.xii.

¹²³ *Agahsazi* (Tehran), Feb. 29, 2008, quoted in “The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics”, by Ali Alfoneh, *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1, 2008.

¹²⁴ Quoted in “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards”, *Council on Foreign Relations*, by Greg Bruno, June 22, 2009.

¹²⁵ With regards to the IRGC's Quds Force, Kenneth M. Pollack, an Iran expert at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy noted that: “There are people who believe the Quds Force does not move a muscle without getting explicit orders from [supreme leader Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei; there are other people who believe they are rogues. The weight of evidence is somewhere in the middle”; quoted in “Iran's Elite and Mysterious Fighters”, by Borzou Daragahi and Peter Spiegel, *Los Angeles Times*, February 15, 2007.

¹²⁶ See fn. 132 and 152.

¹²⁷ “The Revolutionary Guards are primarily self-funded, with annual revenues from its businesses empire estimated at \$1 billion and expected to rise to \$1.5-\$2,” from “Make Iran Feel the Pain”, by Mathew Levitt, *Wall Street Journal Europe*, July 2, 2007; see fn. 34, according to a UPI report, \$46 billion has vanished over the years through the machinations of the IRGC, with much of it being used to fund proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, see “Revolutionary Guard Gains Power in Iran”, June. UPI, 29, 2009.

¹²⁸ James A. Russell is a senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, where he is teaching courses on Middle East security affairs, terrorism, and national security strategy. He also performs sponsored research for a variety of U.S. government organizations. From 1988-2001, Mr. Russell held a variety of positions in the Office of the Assistant Secretary Defense for International Security Affairs, Near East South Asia, Department of Defense. During this period he traveled extensively in the Persian Gulf and Middle East working on U.S. security issues.

¹²⁹ “Illicit Nuclear Procurement Networks and Nuclear Proliferation: Challenges for Intelligence, Detection, and Interdiction”, by Jack Boureston and James A. Russell, <http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/ccc/people/biolinks/russell/russellApr09.pdf>.

¹³⁰“CRS Report for Congress, the Quasi Government: Hybrid Organizations with Both Government and Private Sector legal Characteristics”, January 31, 2008.

¹³¹ FindACase – *Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran*
http://dc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.%5CFDCT%5CDDC%5C2006%5C20060929_0000602.DDC.htm/qx; for more on the IRGC sources of income see fn. 34 and 122.

¹³² Ranstorp, Magnus *Hizb'allah in Lebanon, The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*, Macmillan Press, 1997, P. 84.

¹³³ For more on Hizbullah's semi- independence see Daniel Byman, *States That sponsor Terrorism* P. 90; also see “Iranian State Sponsored Terrorism”, by Sean K. Anderson, *Conflict Quarterly* P 28-30.

¹³⁴ For more on the possible integration of Hizbullah and the IRGC see “Al-Qods Force to Integrate With Hezbollah,” Reform Party of Syria, September 6, 2008: “. . .Our Lebanese sources told RPS that Al-Qods Force has suggested to integrate some of their operation structure with Hezbollah's under the command of Brigadier-General Faramaz Ghasem Suleimani, al-Qods chief commanding officer, for operations in Lebanon and on the border with Israel. . . .”,
<http://reformsyria.org/intelligence/opposition-against-regime/1138-al-qods-force-to-integrate-with-hezbollah.html>.

¹³⁵ “Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development”, P. 2, by Michael Rubin, originally published in Bipartisan Policy Center, September 1, 2008.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Taheri, P. 273

¹³⁸ Ibid. P. 227.

¹³⁹ Arjomand, *After Khomeini, Iran Under His Successor*, P.173

¹⁴⁰ “Thesis – Iranian Foreign Policy – Battleground of Domestic Factional Politics: Implication for US Policy?”, by David Richard Toni, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 1998, P.6.

¹⁴¹ RAND, *The Rise of the Pasdaran – Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*, 2009, P. 12; “Thesis – Iranian Foreign Policy – Battleground of Domestic Factional Politics: Implication for US Policy?”, by David Richard Toni, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 1998; see Byman, *Iran’s Security in the Post Revolutionary Era*, P. xiii: “Myriad individuals, institutions, and organizations play important political and military roles in Iran. . . In general, the various institutions emphasize different issues, to their mutual satisfaction, though in practice they overlap considerably in their duties and beliefs. . . . Many institutions often share the responsibility for formulating and implementing particular policies, leading to duplication and rivalry. In addition, most institutions in Iran are weak, while the personal networks of leaders are strong. Power thus shifts according to the fortunes of individual leaders rather than to the purviews of institutions. Iran's decision-making is characterized by two competing trends—seemingly chaotic complexity and consensus. The large number of institutional and non-institutional actors, family ties, personal relationships, overlapping institutional authority, and the mixture of religion and politics all contrive to make it difficult to identify who has a say on what issue. While there is a formal system for decision-making, it is often ignored or bypassed in favor of an informal, parallel system. . . .”

¹⁴² “Thesis – Iranian Foreign Policy – Battleground of Domestic Factional Politics: Implication for US Policy?”, by David Richard Toni, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1998.

¹⁴³ RAND, *The Rise of the Pasdaran – Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*, P. 11.

¹⁴⁴ Taheri P. 87.

¹⁴⁵ “Revolutionary Guard Wields Power Inside and Outside Iran”, by Gary Thomas, *Voice of America*, April 17, 2007, <http://www.sazegara.net/english/archives/news-links/>.

¹⁴⁶ "Iran's Revolutionary Guard Branches Out", by Kim Murphy, *Los Angeles Times*, August 26, 2007, reprinted in the *Seattle Times*, http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/nationworld/2003855126_iranguard27.html.

¹⁴⁷ *Iran v. Britain: Who Blinked?*, Francis Fukuyama, <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/contd/?p=613>.

¹⁴⁸ RAND, *The Rise of the Pasdaran*, P. 2.

¹⁴⁹ Ali Alfoneh is a visiting research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). He is also a doctoral candidate in the department of political science at the University of Copenhagen. His research areas include civil-military relations in Iran with a special focus on the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Islamic Republic. Mr. Alfoneh has been a research fellow at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College and has taught political economy at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. He was also an independent researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies, Tehran in 2003, and research assistant for the Office of the President of the European Affairs Committee of the Danish Parliament in 2002-2003.

¹⁵⁰ “Indoctrination of the Revolutionary Guards”, by Ali Alfoneh, *Middle Eastern Outlook*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, No.2 February 2009.

¹⁵¹ "Iran's Revolutionary Guard Branches Out", by Kim Murphy, *Los Angeles Times*, August 26, 2007.

¹⁵² Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Iranian politics and the politics of Shiite groups in the Middle East. A Shiite theologian by training, Mr. Khalaji has also served on the editorial boards of two prominent Iranian periodicals and produced for the BBC as well as the U.S. government's Persian news service. From 1986 to 2000, Mr. Khalaji trained in the seminaries of Qom, the traditional center of Iran's clerical establishment. There he studied theology and jurisprudence, earning a doctorate and researching widely on modern intellectual and philosophical-political developments in Iran and the wider Islamic and Western worlds. In Qom, and later in Tehran, Mr. Khalaji launched a career in journalism, first serving on the editorial board of a theological journal, *Naqd va Nazar*, and then the daily *Entekhab*. In addition to his own writing, he has translated the works of the humanist Islamic scholar Muhammad Arkoun. In 2000, Mr. Khalaji moved Paris where he studied Shiite theology and exegesis in the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. He also worked for BBC Persian as a political analyst on Iranian affairs, eventually becoming a broadcaster for the Prague-based Radio Farda, the Persian-language service of the U.S. government's Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. At Radio Farda, he produced news, features, and analysis on a range of Middle Eastern, Iranian, and Islamic issues.

¹⁵³ PolicyWatch #1273, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, Inc.”, by Mehdi Khalaji, August 17, 2007, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

¹⁵⁴ Wilfried Buchta is the permanent representative of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Morocco, and has authored numerous books on Iran.

¹⁵⁵ Wilfried Buchta, *Who Rules Iran*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Konrad Adenauer Stitung, 2000, P. 70, quoting Kenneth Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam, Iran's Revolutionary Guards*.

¹⁵⁶ “The Role of the Quds force in the Revolutionary Guard” by Douglas Farrah; for more on the debate regarding Qods Force independence of action see “President Bush and Qods Force Controversy”, by Dan Diker, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 6, 2007.

¹⁵⁷ “Iranian Force, Focus of U.S., Still a Mystery”, by Scott Shane, *New York Times*, February 17, 2007; also Kenneth M. Pollack, an Iran expert at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy noted that: “There are people who believe the Quds Force does not move a muscle without getting explicit orders from [supreme leader Ayatollah Ali] Khomeini; there are other people who believe they are rogues. The weight of evidence is somewhere in the middle”, quoted in “Iran’s Elite and Mysterious Fighters”, by Borzou Daragahi and Peter Spiegel, *Los Angeles Times*, February 15, 2007.

¹⁵⁸ American Enterprise Institute’s Ali Alfoneah and Stanford’s Abbas Milani quoted in “Backgrounder, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards”, by Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://209.85.135.132/search?q=cache:tBs7onaurgEJ:www.cfr.org/publication/14324/+CFR%2Birc&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca>.

¹⁵⁹ “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Tightens Grip”, by Scott Peterson, *Christian Science Monitor*, December 9, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1209/p10s01-wome.html>.

¹⁶⁰ “Backgrounder, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards”, by Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://209.85.135.132/search?q=cache:tBs7onaurgEJ:www.cfr.org/publication/14324/+CFR%2Birc&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca>.

¹⁶¹ Arjomand, *After Khomeini, Iran Under His Successors*, Chapter 10.

¹⁶² “Who’s really in charge? Is There a Confrontation Looming Between Iran’s Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard?”, Muhammad Sahimi, Los Angeles, July 28, 2009, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/07/showdown-between-khamenei-and-irgc.html>; see also *The Rise of Pasdaran*, P.xvi, regarding the IRGC’s ignoring an injunction from the Supreme Leader to privatize their holdings – “a significant development that could portend the IRGC moving closer to becoming an effective counter-authority to the Supreme Leader.”; See also “Iran’s Most Radical Regime”, by Patrick Devenny, *FrontPage Magazine*, August 23, 2005, written prior to the present crisis: “...as the organizations power and influence grows its abject loyalty to Khomeini...becomes more and more tenuous. ...[D]isobedience has increased in recent years. Turf battles between the IRGC and those close to Khomeini have already erupted over various doctrinal and economic issues.... Khomeini...now relies heavily on his guardians in the IRGC...a somewhat fragile agreement that the IRGC can be expected to take advantage of it”; Devenny is the Henry M. Jackson Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Washington D.C.

¹⁶³ “Contending with Iran’s Sponsorship of Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation”, 2009 International Counterterrorism Conference, featuring Matthew Levitt, September 9, 2009; http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/09/contending_with_irans_sponsors.php.

¹⁶⁴ Buchta, P. 164; see also the Iran Terror Database, <http://www.iranterror.com/content/view/28/42/>; and Abbas Milani, director of Iranian studies at Stanford University, quoted in “Iranian Force, Focus of U.S., Still a Mystery”, by Scott Shane, *New York Times*, February 17, 2007.

¹⁶⁵ Iran Terror Database, <http://www.iranterror.com/content/view/28/42/>

¹⁶⁶ “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces”, *Rough Working Draft*, P. 7, by Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 16, 2007: “ It has often difficult to separate the activities of the IRGC, the Vezarat-e-Etellea’at va Amniat-e Keshvar and the Foreign Ministry and many seem to be integrated operations managed by a ministerial committee called the Special Operations Council.”

¹⁶⁷ Cordesman P. 14

¹⁶⁸ PolicyWatch #1273, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, Inc.”, by Mehdi Khalaji, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 17, 2007.

¹⁶⁹ Buchta, *Who Rules Iran*, P. 69, RAND *The Rise of the Pasdaran*, P.9, and the Council on Foreign Relations, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards”, by Greg Bruno, June 22, 2009 and others, estimate that the Force is comprised only of a 1000 men. Others have estimated the numbers of be as high as 50,000 men, see “Iranian Force, Focus of U.S., Still a Mystery”, by Scott Shane, *New York Times*, February 17, 2007; Cordesman in “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces”, quotes Iran’s Supreme national Council (SNSC) as deciding to increase the personnel of the Qods Force to 15,000.

¹⁷⁰ Cordesman P. 4.

¹⁷¹ Taheri, P.251

¹⁷² The IRGC utilizes vigilante groups such as Ansar-e Hezbollah that operate outside legal channels to pressure the government to conform to revolutionary values, even when the Supreme Leader is willing to compromise – see “Indoctrination of the Revolutionary Guards”, by Ali Alfoneh, *Middle Eastern Outlook*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, No.2 February 2009.

¹⁷³ Cordesman P 12; also see Reza Shafa, “What Would Happen if the US puts the IRGC on the Terrorist List”, August 31, 2007, National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) on IRGC dominance in MOIS and its control over the State Security Forces (SSF) which is an amalgamation of police, Gendarmerie and the Revolutionary Komitehs.

¹⁷⁴ Also spelled Bassij or Baseej, meaning “mobilized”; officially designated the Basij Resistance Force. Along with the Revolutionary Guards, the *Basij* is the ideological-military core of the Islamic regime, glorifying values such as martyrdom and self-sacrifice for the sake of Islam. For more on the relationship of the Basij to the IRGC and the Basij in the IRGC’s activities in Lebanon see “What Do Structural Changes in the Revolutionary Guards Mean?”, by Ali Alfoneh, AEI Outlook Series, September 2008; Noted expert Frederick W. Kagan, an American resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and a former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, described the Basij as a “group that is like a combination of a military reserve, Boy Scouts, and the Komsohl or Hitler Youth.”

¹⁷⁵ Cordesman, P.12, quoting US Department of State on Iranian sources stating that Basij number anywhere from 11 to 20 million and a western study claiming there are 90,000 active members and up to 300,000 reservists. In RAND’s *The Rise of the Pasdaran*: “600,000 of the 3 million active members of the Basij are part of armed military units that regularly take part in... military training....”; Other have estimated that the Basij number between numbers between one and nine million, see Gary Thomas, “Revolutionary Guard Wields Power Inside and Outside Iran”, Voice of America, April 17, 2007, quoting Mohsen Sazegara, a former Revolutionary Guard leader who accompanied Ayatollah Khomeini back to Iran in 1979 and who left Iran in 2003, after being imprisoned for dissident views. He now lectures at Harvard University; <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-04/2007-04-17-voa56.cfm?CFID=154720495&CFTOKEN=87430942>; The Persian-language daily *Kayhan*, November 29, 2005, reported that nine million Iranians, including Iranian President Ahmadinejad, marked Basij Week by forming a human chain over a distance of 8,700 km. In Tehran alone, 1,250,000 people participated. Ayatollah Khomeini envisioned the Basij as army of 20-million volunteers, <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA26206>.

The IRGC and Esteshadion

Tehran, Iran, Jul. 22 – A military garrison has been opened in Iran to recruit and train volunteers for “martyrdom-seeking operations”, according to the garrison’s commander, Mohammad-Reza Jaafari. Jaafari, a senior officer in the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), told a hard-line weekly close to Iran’s ultra-conservative President-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that the new “Lovers of Martyrdom Garrison” (*Gharargah-e Asheghane Shahadat*, in Persian) would recruit individuals willing to carry out suicide operations against Western targets. The full text of the original interview in Persian can be seen on the weekly’s website at www.partosokhan.ir/283/page08.pdf.

“The Lovers of Martyrdom Garrison has been activated and we will form a Martyrdom-seeking Division for each province in the country, organised in brigades, battalions and companies to defend Islam”, Jaafari told the weekly Parto-Sokhan. The weekly is published in the Shiite holy city of Qom by the Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute. The institute’s chairman, hard-line cleric Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, is regarded as the ideological mentor of President-elect Ahmadinejad. The weekly carried a report in its July 13 issue on a meeting between Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and the commander of Lovers of Martyrdom Garrison. Jaafari was quoted by the weekly as saying that the organisation of “martyrdom-seeking popular forces” was being implemented on the basis of instructions from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces....

The weekly’s interview with Jaafari appeared under the title, “Commander of Lovers of Martyrdom Garrison: Let America and Israel know, each of our suicide volunteers equals a nuclear bomb”....

“One of our garrison’s aims is to spot martyrdom-seeking individuals in society and then recruit and organise them, so that, God willing, at the right moment when the Commander-in-Chief of the country’s armed forces [Ayatollah Khamenei] gives the order, they would be able to enter the scene and carry out their missions”, Jaafari said.... See “Iran opens garrison to recruit suicide bombers against West”, Iran Focus, July 22, 2005, <http://www.iranfocus.com/en/terrorism/iran-opens-garrison-to-recruit-suicide-bombers-against-west-02944.html>.

A Convention for Suicide-bombers 2004 -- On June 5, 2004, the reformist Iranian daily *Sharq* reported on the first Esteshadion conference for registering Iranian volunteers for martyrdom [Shehada] operations, held in Tehran by the World Islamic Organization's Headquarters for Remembering the Shahids. *Sharq* reported that those who join have three choices: To train for suicide attacks to defend Iran's national interests, for suicide attacks against Israel or the assassination of British author Salman Rushdie. Registration is easy. "There is no need to list detailed personal information. The volunteers need fill in only their name, father's name, age, identity number, and telephone number for contact in time of need. Occupation and education were of no interest to the form's compilers; similarly, there is no requirement for organization membership in order to carry out martyrdom operations." Participating in the conference were the headquarters directors, public figures, and **Iranian Revolutionary Guards commanders** such as General Salami, head of The Revolutionary Guards Headquarters for Strategic Operations.

A Seminar for Suicide-bombers 2006 -- In October 2006 Esteshadion ran a seminar for several hundred students at Khajeh Nasir University in Tehran. Samadi reviewed the history of the suicide bombing as a weapon, and organizers showed video clips of suicide attacks against Israelis. Hasan Abbasi a former member of the **IRGC** was the main speaker. Abbasi is a well-known Iranian political scientist, the head of the National Security and Strategic Research Center, and is the chief theoretician to Ali Khamenei. He is one of the **pillars of the reigning IRGC establishment** and his willingness to address an Esteshadion gathering should be viewed as a demonstration of the prestige with which the group is held by the Tehran regime.

Global Aspirations -- Although Samed and Firooz Rajai, another leader of the organization, stated that volunteers have not been sent to carry out missions, the London Arabic-language daily *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* reported in June 2004 that a group sent from Iran on a suicide mission to Iraq had apparently been apprehended and handed over to British forces in Iraq. Then in a July 2, 2005, *Al-Arabiya* TV broadcast, Esteshadion interviewees underlined the "successful" cooperation between the organization and the Palestinian movements Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In the following year, on [April 19](#) 2006, the UK Guardian reported that Esteshadion had announced that it was seeking to recruit new members from within Britain's Muslim population, as UK passport holders were able to enter Israel with relative ease. The British embassy in Iran had asked the Islamist regime to denounce the group. A foreign office spokesman said: "We have longstanding concerns at the support that Iran provides to groups undermining peace in the Middle East through violence, including the activities of this group." Four

months later in August 2006, Adnkronos International (AKI) reported that Firooz Rajai had claimed that some of her recruits had already trained abroad, and said that there were 100 or so people from Europe among their number. She also claimed that there are already two units based in Lebanon, but said that these will only act when Hizbullah requests it. (Rajai has an MA in political science and is reported to have taken part in the 444 day hostage-taking of 52 US members of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1977.)

¹⁷⁷ Taheri P. 96.

¹⁷⁸ Anderson, Sean K., "Iranian State-Sponsored Terrorism", *Conflict Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No.4, Fall 1991: "Not long after the 1979 revolution a department for liberation movements had been set up in the Foreign Ministry. At that time the Islamic fundamentalists perceived the Foreign Minister Sadeq Qutbzadeh as being outside of the Imam's "Line" and not trustworthy. The 1980 Liberation Movements Conference was the occasion used by the fundamentalists to change the jurisdiction of the department for liberation movements from the Foreign Ministry to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a context in which they could pursue their own version of exporting the revolution while side-stepping the detested Qutbzadeh. The eventual creation of the "Department [for support] of Liberation Movements," by decree of the Imam following this Conference, created one command structure for conducting terrorist operations. This office began sending IRGC units to Lebanon in June 1981."; see Arjomand P. 134-135: "...the radical Foreign Minister Mir Hossein Musavi, set up a committee 'to determine the basis of a foreign policy from an ideological perspective' and drew up a 'plan an Islamic front worldwide. An Islamic Revolutionary Council was established as an umbrella organization covering the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Islamic Revolution Movement of the Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain... all linked to the Islamic liberation movement unit of the Revolutionary Guards."

¹⁷⁹ Baer, Robert, *See No Evil*, Crown, New York (2002), P. 81 quoted in Wikipedia, "Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_of_the_Guardians_of_the_Islamic_Revolution.

¹⁸⁰ *Sisso v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48526 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007).

The bombing was the first large-scale attack against a U.S. Embassy anywhere in the world. See Ex. 19 (Oakley Dep. Tr.) at 22; see also Tr. Vol. I at 121-22; Ex. 35 at 13. At the time, it was not immediately clear who was responsible for the bombing. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. II at 27-28; Tr. Vol. I at 121. But by 1984, the U.S. State Department, in its annual publication "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983," noted that "radical Lebanese Shi'a using the nom-de-guerre Islamic Jihad" and "operating with Iranian support and encouragement" were "responsible for the suicide attacks against the U.S. Embassy." See Ex. 20 at 11 (also at Oakley Dep. Ex. 1); Ex. 22 (discussing Islamic Jihad terrorist activities, including, inter alia, the 1983 Beirut Embassy bombing, as "part of a major terrorist campaign aimed at the elimination of U.S. and western influence in Lebanon."); Oakley Dep. Tr. at 23-25. The terrorist group Islamic Jihad has been known by various names, including Right Against Wrong, the Revolutionary Justice Organization, and, perhaps most commonly, [*272] Hizbollah. n4 See Ex. 19 (Oakley Depo. Tr.) at 46; see also Oakley Dep. Ex. 10 (also at Ex. 29) at 304. In connection [*6] with the evidentiary hearing in this matter, Ambassador Robert Oakley -- who, as the coordinator of the State Department's counterterrorism efforts, was tasked with assessing who was behind the 1983 Beirut Embassy bombing, see Ex. 19 (Oakley Dep. Tr.) at 9 -- testified that it ultimately became "very clear that Islamic Jihad [Hizbollah] was behind the bombing in 1983." Id. at 21. Ambassador Oakley further expressed "confidence that the government of Iran was involved directly in the Hizbollah organization, which was created, armed, trained, protected, provided technical assistance by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards." Id. at 21.

¹⁸¹ Gold, Dore, *The Rise of Nuclear Iran*, quoting a recently reclassified document from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA implicating Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the former Iranian Ambassador to Syria, a founder of Hizbullah and one of those responsible for the bombing of the US embassy in Beirut by IRGC directed terrorists) See [IRGC Threat: New 'Punch' Same As The Old 'Punch'](http://threatswatch.org/commentary/2007/08/), by Steve Schippert | August 20, 2007, regarding Mohtashemi as an IRGC operative, <http://threatswatch.org/commentary/2007/08/>; see also *London Sunday Times*, August 18, 2009, quoting former CIA agent Robert Baer; see also "Hoover Scholar, Attorney Defends Representing Libya", by Shawn Cohen, *Washington Jewish Week*, December 22, 1995; also see "The Lockerbie Bombing, Syria, Iran Palestinians, Confession of an Iranian Terror Czar", by Dr. Ludwig de Braecheleer, January 12, 2008, <http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/1346#When:11:40:00>; regarding Iran's support of Jibril's PFLP-GC suspected of involvement in the bombing see former FBI Director Louis Freeh: "Before his

appointment as the top U.S. administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer chaired the National Commission on Terrorism, which studied the Khobar attack. The commission concluded that "Iran remains the most active state supporter of terrorism. . . . The IRGC and MOIS have continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts. They also provide funding, training, weapons, logistical resources, and guidance to a variety of terrorist groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and PFLP-GC." Quoted in "Remember Khobar Towers", by Louis Freeh, *Wall Street Journal*, May 20, 2003, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110003518>.

¹⁸² US civil cases that found IRGC liability as a result of terrorist attacks:

Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96024 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2009)
Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90233 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2009)
Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90146, 22-23 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2009)
Wachsman ex rel. Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 603 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (D.D.C. 2009)
Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 575 F. Supp. 2d 181, 195 (D.D.C. 2008)
Levin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2007)
Nikbin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 517 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424 (D.D.C. 2007)
Sisso v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48526 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007)
Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261, 272 (D.D.C. 2005)
Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2005)

¹⁸³ "Iran's al Qaeda – If the Revolutionary Guards Aren't Terrorists, Who Is?", by Bret Stephens, *Wall Street Journal*, October 16, 2007.

¹⁸⁴ According to the Argentine State prosecutor's report, the AMIA bombing was initially proposed by the Qods Force.

¹⁸⁵ Taheri, P.98.

¹⁸⁶ See RAND the *Rise of the Pasdaran*.

¹⁸⁷ Byman, *Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era*

¹⁸⁸ "Iran's Revolutionary Guards", Council on Foreign Relations, by Greg Bruno, June 22, 2009, quoting Mehdi Khalaji a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

¹⁸⁹ Taheri, P.251; there were reports in the media of IRGC personnel being arrested, see *The Washington Times* in the *Water Cooler – A Global Blog*, June 15, 2009, quoting the *Cyrus News Agency* which reported that 16 senior members of the IRGC were arrested and *The Guardian's* live blog reported on June 22, 2009 that at approximately 1:30 pm, General Ali Fazli, the newly appointed commander of the Revolutionary Guards in Tehran province, has been arrested for refusing to carry Khomeini's order to use force against demonstrators, referenced in Wikipedia, "2009 Iranian Election Protests", fn. 60, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Iranian_election_protests

¹⁹⁰ <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r110:./temp/~r110R59cdN>

¹⁹¹ Cordesman P.3.

¹⁹² Key IRGC persons identified by the European Union on June 24, 2008 as entities of proliferation concern include: Brigadier-General Javad Darvish-Vand (Deputy for Inspection for MODAFL, Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics - see separate entity record), Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi Farahi (Managing Director of DIO, Defense Industries Organization - see separate entity record), Brigadier-General Ali Hoseynitash (Head of the General Department of the Supreme National Security Council), Brigadier-General Mostafa Mohammad Najjar (Minister of MODAFL), Brigadier-General Ali Shamshiri (MODAFL Deputy for Counter-Intelligence), and Brigadier-General Ahmad Vahidi (Deputy Head of

MODAFL) (see separate entity records); additional key persons identified in an annex to U.N. Security Council resolution 1747 of March 24, 2007 include: Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC), Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (most recently former Chief of IRGC Joint Staff), Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground Forces), Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy), Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (most recently former Commander of Bassij resistance force), Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force) and General Zolqadr (Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs) (see separate entity records); General Hosein Salimi (Commander of the IRGC Air Force) and Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi (former Commander of IRGC and advisor and senior aide to Iran's supreme leader for armed forces affairs) were identified in an annex to U.N. Security Council resolution 1737 of December 23, 2006 (see separate entity records), <http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/iran-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc.html>.

¹⁹³ Mathew Levitt, “Target Iranian Forces”, *Washington Times*, February 16, 2007.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Olivier Guitta, Hezbollah an Imminent Danger, *Middle East Times*, November 17, 2008; “Security Services Warn of Possible Hezbollah Sleeper Cell Terror Attacks – Europe”, *National Terror Alert*, August 12, 2008, <http://www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/2008/08/12/security-services-warn-of-possible-hezbollah-sleeper-cell-terror-attacks-europe/>; “Germany: Security Services Warn of Possible Hezbollah Attacks”, *adnkronos international*, August 11, 2008.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ See Guitta in fn. 59.

¹⁹⁸ “The Hezbollah Threat in Africa”, by Mathew Levitt, January 4, 2004, the *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*;

¹⁹⁹ “The Hezbollah Threat in Africa”, by Mathew Levitt, January 4, 2004.

²⁰⁰ “The Hezbollah Threat in Africa”, by Mathew Levitt, January 4, 2004.

²⁰¹ From the Opening remarks of Ronald K. Noble, INTERPOL Secretary General, 20th Americas Regional Conference, Viña del Mar, Chile 1 April 2009.

²⁰² “Our World: Iran’s Western Enablers”, by Caroline Glick, *Jerusalem Post*, April 14, 2009.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Iranian Elements Are In Charge of Security for Comoros President Sambu, MEMRI, July 28, 2008 <http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD200408>.

²⁰⁵ “Iran’s Global Ambition”, by Michael Rubin, AEI Outlook Series, March 2008, <http://www.aei.org/outlook/27658>.

²⁰⁶ “Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah: Strategic Penetration in Latin America”, by Dr. Ely Karmon, IDC Herzliya –International Institute for Counter-terrorism, April 15, 2009, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/677/currentpage/1/Default.aspx>

²⁰⁷ “Our World: Iran’s Western Enablers”, by Caroline Glick.

²⁰⁸ Profits, in the form of U.S. dollars, from sales in the United States are difficult to bring over the border; dollars are heavier than the drugs and once over the border extremely difficult to convert pesos once in the Latin American countries. Instead, peso brokers sell the dollars to Colombian businessmen, who purchase products from legitimate American

companies and then sell the products for pesos. The pesos returned to the peso Broker are funneled back to the traffickers after a percentage is taken out by the broker; see fn. 74.

²⁰⁹ “Venezuelan Ties to Hezbollah”, ICT database Staff, IDC Herzliya – ICT (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism), August 14, 2008, <http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/477/currentpage/5/Default.aspx>

²¹⁰ “President Bush and the Qods Force Controversy: Lessons Learned”, by Dan Diker, March 2007, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, <http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=376&PID=1850&IID=1516>

²¹¹ “Our World: Iran’s Western Enablers”, by Caroline Glick.

²¹² “Reassessing the Transnational Terrorism-Criminal Link in South America's Tri-Border Area”, *Jamestown Publication: Terrorism Monitor* Volume: 6 Issue: 18, September 22, 2008; also see “Hezbollah Builds a Western Base”, by Pablo Gato and Robert Windrem, *Telemundo and MNSBC*, May 9, 2007.

²¹³ “RAND: Organized Crime, Terrorists, Embrace Film Piracy”, *HNSW, Homeland Security Newswire*, March 9, 2009.

²¹⁴ “Our World: Iran’s Western Enablers”, and Karmon, “Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah: Strategic Penetration in Latin America”.

²¹⁵ Karmon *ibid*.

²¹⁶ “[DEA Document Suggests Iran Training Sinaloa Cartel](#)”, posted in *Bloggings by boz*, quoting “Entrenan en Irán sicarios de Sinaloa”, in *El Universal.com*:

Los cárteles de Sinaloa y del Golfo han contactado a grupos extremistas de Irán para enviar a ese país a sicarios de élite, generalmente ex militares, con el fin de que reciban entrenamiento en uso de armas y explosivos, de acuerdo con información del gobierno estadounidense. Desde 2005 el narcotráfico mantiene relación con esas organizaciones, según reportes de circulación restringida de la Agencia Antidrogas (DEA) a los que tuvo acceso EL UNIVERSAL.

Para llegar a esa región asiática los integrantes del crimen organizado se desplazan a Venezuela,

de donde parten vuelos cada semana. En algunos casos viajan con pasaportes venezolanos, mencionó un funcionario del Departamento de Estado. Explicó que los sicarios se entrenan debido a que no han utilizado al 100% las armas de alto poder que poseen, como las bazucas.

Las dependencias estadounidenses consideraron que se trata de un elevado riesgo de seguridad nacional tanto para México como para Estados Unidos, debido a que el entrenamiento se enfoca en cinco áreas: tácticas, líderes, operaciones de comando, armas y explosivos. Uno de los grupos que han sido contactados son las Guardias Revolucionarias Islámicas que dan adiestramiento avanzado en cohetes, armas automáticas, rifles para francotiradores y explosivos. De acuerdo con el reporte, el cártel de Juárez envía a sus sicarios a Colombia para ser entrenados por las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FARC) o solicita a ese grupo entrenamiento en México.

²¹⁷ “Hezbollah uses Mexican Drug Routes into U.S. Works beside Smuggler Cartels to Fund Operations”, *Washington Times*, March 27, 2009, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/27/hezbollah-uses-mexican-drug-routes-into-us/?page=3>.

²¹⁸ “Israel Ties 2 Nations to Iran’s Uranium”, the *New York Times*, in article from the *Associated Press*, May 25, 2009.

²¹⁹ “Impunity in Iran, “The Death of Photojournalist Zahra Kazemi”, Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2006, P.9.